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In this study commercial sugarcane farmers' risk preferences are measured and tested,
amongst other factors, as determinants of their soil conservation decisions. Motivation for
this research stems from ongoing erosion on South African commercial farms, including
sugarcane farms; recognition that agricultural economists have a poor understanding of
factors affecting soil conservation; and because little positive economic research has been
conducted linking risk preferences to environmental choice. This research also affords the
opportunity to investigate both theoretically and empirically the effect of the range of the data
on the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient (AP); and to investigate factors affecting
farmers' risk preference. Both of these are important topics for research.
The proposed conceptual model views farmers' soil conservation decisions in a system
analogous to a demand system from which a probabilistic choice model of the adoption of
soil conservation practices is developed. This model relates adoption of soil conservation
technologies to the demand for soil conservation using derived demand theory. Consequently,
soil conservation decisions are analysed in terms of both achieved soil conservation efficiency
and farmers' choices of soil conservation measures. This conceptual model further advances
previous research in that it provides a sound economic base for the analysis and it accounts
for intra-farm variations in soil conservation decisions.
It is demonstrated that AP's must be adjusted for the range as well as the scale of the
data for comparison of risk preferences across different risk situations. Although Raskin and
Cochran's (1986) theorems adjust AP's for the scale of the data and are widely used in
agricultural economic research, they only adjust correctly for the range of the data under
special circumstances. It is demonstrated that in previous agricultural economic research
AP's have been incorrectly adjusted for the range of the data and that the effect of the range
on AP's has been often incorrectly interpreted as a wealth affect. It appears that informing
agricultural economists of the sensitivity of AP's to the range of the data is important. An
approach is proposed for adjusting AP's for both the scale and the range of the data.
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Fifty three commercial sugarcane farmers from KwaZulu-Natal were surveyed by
personal interview during May and June 1996 to elicit farmers' risk preferences and
information on their soil conservation decisions. Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion
coefficients are elicited using a direct elicitation of utility approach. Two farmers refused to
participate in lottery games for religious or moral reasons. Of the remainder 57.2 percent
were risk averse, 29.6 percent risk neutral and 13.2 percent risk preferring. On average they
were risk averse although risk preferences vary significantly amongst individuals. Regression
analysis indicates that on average sugarcane farmers are averse to a possible loss in wealth
relative to initial wealth and they exhibit increasing absolute risk aversion although at a
decreasing rate with increasing gamble range.
Technological information is used to assess KwaZulu-Natal commercial sugarcane
farmers' intra-plot (panel) soil conservation relative to requirements of the Conservation of
Natural Resources Act of 1983. Findings indicate that farmers consider enforcement of the
Act to be unlikely and that 28 percent of farmers surveyed do not meet adequate intra-panel
soil conservation standards. This partially reflects that a large proportion of farmers have not
yet completed implementing their soil conservation plans. Nonetheless, policy makers should
examine factors impeding adequate enforcement of the 1983 Act.
Multiple regression and principal component analysis techniques are used to analyse
farmers' soil conservation decisions. Decisions are analysed in terms of achieved intra-field
soil conservation adoption and soil conservation effort, and farmers' choices of soil
conservation measures. Measurements of soil conservation efficiency are defined to be
objective, be suitable for relative analysis, and reflect intensiveness of adoption.
Extensiveness of adoption is captured by eliciting information for more than one field per
farm. Achieved goodness of fit statistics are good compared to previous similar studies and
indicate that intra-farm variations in soil conservation contain important information
explaining soil conservation decisions. Findings generally support the conceptual exposition
that the demand for soil conservation technologies is derived primarily from the demand for
soil conservation. However, the demand for fire insurance does affect adoption of strip
cropping, and hence soil conservation decisions.
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Results indicate that although risk and risk preferences are not significant
determinants of the quantity of soil conservation demanded by sugarcane farmers, they are
significant determinants of their soil conservation decisions. Firstly, the rate at which more
risk averse farmers tend to undertake extensive restructuring of sugarcane field layouts tends
to be relatively slow. This verifies the hypothesis that risk averse farmers value an option to
postpone capital intensive, irreversible investments. Secondly, relatively risk averse farmers
are more likely to adopt strip cropping programmes. This finding is attributed to their
aversion to income risk and not risk of excessive soil loss. The hypothesis that risk averse
farmers adopt soil conservation practices to reduce risk of serious erosion is not supported.
It is concluded that farmers' abilities to assess soil conservation efficiency is poor,
especially with respect to the partial contribution of conservation structures to achieved soil
conservation efficiency; while farmers tend to implement soil conservation on steeper slopes
first; and perceive minimum tillage and strip cropping programmes to be imperfectly
compatible. Adoption of minimum tillage, trash mulching and strip cropping are primarily
constrained by physical climatic, field and soil characteristics and to a lesser extent by
farmers' management time and technical abilities. Implementation of improved soil
conservation structures is constrained by financial constraints. Amongst other factors,
education and use of extension information sources and adoption of land use plans are
positively related to both conservation adoption and effort. Soil conservation policies must
make farmers more aware of soil erosion. This is best achieved through provision of specific
technical information, especially land use plans.
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The objective of this research is to jointly study risk preferences and soil conservation
decisions of KwaZulu-Natal commercial sugarcane farmers at the micro-level from an
economic perspective. Although much research has been devoted to the theory of soil
conservation choices, almost no positive economic research has been conducted on the
implications of uncertainty and farmers' risk preferences for these choices. In this study
farmers' risk preferences will be measured and tested in soil conservation decisions. The
motivation for this research arises primarily from theoretical and regulatory purposes.
Estimated annual soil loss in KwaZulu-Natal is in the region of 100 million tons
(Maher, 1996). Positive net erosion, that is a rate of soil loss greater than the rate of soil
formation, will reduce the long term productivity of cropland resources and has a detrimental
impact on environmental quality. Fuggel and Rabie (1992: 191) suggest that erosion is
possibly the greatest environmental problem facing South Africa. Given topography, soil
type and weather, farm practices determine the level of erosion. Since, farmers are the agents
through which any reductions in erosion will be brought about, analysis of factors affecting
farmers' soil conservation decisions will facilitate assessment of soil conservation policy
options.
Although sugarcane is regarded as having good water and soil conserving properties,
soils in South African sugarcane growing areas are mostly granular, leached, prone to crusting
and have high rates of erosion once the natural vegetation is removed (Platford, 1987). Soil
degradation and loss have been partially attributed to negating expected improvements in
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yield productivity from newly released varieties of sugarcane over the past two decades
(Meyer et al, 1996). Despite good progress in conservation measures amongst members of
the Sugar Industry reported in 1992 (Anonymous, 1992), McFarlane and Maher (1993)
reported that only nine percent of completed requests for farm assessments conformed with
the 1983 Act in all aspects. Further, Ardington, quoted in Fitz-Gerald (1996), recently drew
attention to ongoing erosion on KwaZulu-Natal sugarcane farms.
In terms of the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act of 1983 ex ante soil
conservation requirements may be enforced by ex ante penalties, ie. farmers can be
prosecuted for carrying out practices that could lead to soil erosion. Conservation
committees, drawn from farmers' associations, government officers and other technical
representatives, are responsible for applying the 1983 Act, under the guidance of the minister
of agriculture (McFarlane and Maher, 1993). However, Maher, quoted in Fitz-Gerald (1996),
contends that South African sugarcane farmers are not being held accountable for soil erosion
on their farms by either the sugar industry or the Departments of Agriculture or Justice,
resulting in too few farmers implementing adequate soil conservation.
Issues central to the economics of soil conservation are (a) externalities associated
with erosion, and (b) the balance between present and future income. Problems with
agricultural externalities, such as those associated with soil erosion, are their non-point source
nature, the large number of polluters, the large number of victims, and their stochastic nature.
Common law solutions are often impossible as proof of violation, identification of the culprit,
and the amount of liability must be ascertainable. If landowners do not receive the full net
social benefits of an erosion control investment, they will under invest in erosion control from
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a social perspective. Consequently, where externalities from soil erosion exist, soil
conservation from a social perspective will always be suboptimal in the absence of
government intervention.
Virtually all economists agree that, at least in theory, a farmer's soil conservation
decisions are based on his estimates of his costs of the conservation investment versus the
costs of loosing soil to erosion (Ervin and Ervin, 1982). When considering only on-site
productivity damages and assuming a perfectly functioning and costless capital market,
landowners theoretically receive adequate incentives through private markets to achieve
socially optimal levels of soil conservation. In other words, if land prices reflect the value of
conservation improvements, a landowner can obtain the undepreciated investment in terms of
a higher price when property is sold (Featherstone and Goodwin, 1993). Landowners will
then have equal planning horizons to society and soil conservation will be socially optimal
(Gardner and Barrows, 1985).
Costs of information discovery on soil conservation efficiency may be high due to
the generally indiscernible nature of most soil erosion, the masking effects of productivity
improvements on soil degradation, and because costs and benefits change according to
location. Costs of information discovery are likely to be inversely related to awareness of
suboptimal soil conservation, which is commonly conceptualised as a precursor to
implementing soil conservation measures (eg. Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Barlow, 1995). High
costs of information on soil conservation efficiency may result in farmers being relatively less
aware of the costs (benefits) of actual erosion (soil conservation). Soil conservation
efficiency will then be suboptimal, even if farmland markets are efficient.
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Hedonic pricing studies have tested the hypothesis that, even if farmland markets
function efficiently, farmland prices may not account for the effects of past erosion or
potential erosivity on future net returns to land if the costs of information discovery regarding
soil conservation are high (Ervin and Mill, 1985). Ervin and Mill (1985), Gardner and
Barrows (1985), King and Sinden (1988) and Palmquist and Danialson (1989) have all used
hedonic pricing models but have found mixed results. Their findings generally suggest that
conservation investment is more likely to be capitalised into land values when the need for
soil conservation is highly apparent. It may be concluded that costs of information discovery
are relatively lower, but not necessarily low, on land where the need for soil conservation is
distinct. This echoes Bennet's (1945, as cited by Scotney, 1978: 1) observation that "The
extent of damage [from soil erosion] greatly exceeds common understanding and the average
person does not notice the far more serious effects of erosion represented by the less
spectacular process of sheet washing."
Whereas several economic studies of farmers' soil conservation decisions have been
completed in the United States (eg. Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Featherstone and Goodwin, 1993;
Saliba and Bromley, 1986), only two studies have been completed in South Africa: Barlow
and Nieuwoudt (1995) and Basson (1962). Although Barlow and Nieuwoudt's (1995) study
encompassed KwaZulu-Natal sugarcane growers and is recent, data restrictions in their study
necessitated measurement of soil conservation effort essentially in terms of farmer's own
assessments, which, by their own admission, does not necessarily reflect conservation
effectiveness (Barlow and Nieuwoudt, 1995). By way of contrast, technical information
specific to sugarcane farming is used to objectively assess soil conservation effectiveness in
this study.
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Theoretically risk preferences may be important in explaining farmers' soil
conservation decisions (Ardila and Innes, 1993). Although farmers' risk preferences are
frequently included in normative economic studies of soil conservation decisions (eg. Kramer
et al, 1985; and McSweeny and Kramer, 1986; Setia, 1987), these models assume that
farmers know the correct probabilities of the events at risk and through specification of these
risks essentially predetermine the effect of risk on decisions. In reality, farmers are
confronted with a diverse array of information about soil conservation and consequently have
subjective probability distributions of current and future income, wealth, and other attributes
according to soil conservation practices adopted. How farmers deal with this complexity is
important. Only a few positive economic studies have related uncertainty and farmers'
attitudes towards risk to the economics of soil conservation. Those studies that have
considered risk attitudes all constructed (potentially unreliable) indices of risk orientation
using attitudinal questions. More precise measurement of farmers' risk preferences may
facilitate understanding the role of risk preferences on farmers' decisions.
Further motivation for the elicitation of risk preferences is to facilitate future research.
A measure of risk aversion may be needed to weigh alternative activities that involve risk.
Rather than selecting levels that give desired quantitative results, researchers should select
values that represent plausible levels of risk aversion to aid policy makers (Babcock et al,
1993). Developing appropriate methodology for assessing risk attitudes then becomes an
important goal for research, and knowledge of the distribution of risk preferences within a
(similar) population is important.
Young's (1979) review shows that the principal uses of elicited risk aversion
coefficients are for (a) farm management extension applications, (b) technology adoption and
rural participation applications, and (c) policy and predictive applications. He concluded that
considerable heterogeneity in risk preferences among individuals; requirements of frequent
updating of individuals risk preferences in response to changing objectives, information and
attitudes; and time, cost and practical problems associated with elicitation of risk preferences
are likely to limit their use in extension programs (Young, 1979). A review of application of
risk research in farm management and extension programs over the past twenty five years by
Patrick and DeVuyst (1995) confirms Young's views although they concluded that progress is
being made in this regard.
Estimating the willingness of farmers to adopt a new technology or participate in rural
development programs may be facilitated by knowledge of risk preferences. Risk preferences
have been shown to be important in many decisions including grain marketing decisions (eg.
Blakeslee and Lone, 1995), use of agricultural chemicals (eg. Babcock, 1992; Feder, 1979),
producers' participation in farm commodity programs in the 1980's (Kramer and Pope, 1981),
and choice of marketing strategies (eg. Johnson and Foster, 1994). Smith and Desvousges
(1986) and Desvousges et al (1988, cited by Eom, 1992) verified the existence of averting
behaviour to decrease health risks, and Eom (1992) found perceived health risk to be a
primary determinant of consumers' choice of fresh produce. However, frequently other
variables are more important in explaining these decisions.
Whilst farm management and development programming applications may not justify
measurement of individuals' risk preferences, in the arena of policy and predictive
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applications such measures are sometimes justified (Young, 1979). To quote Anderson et al
(1977: 312) "Policy makers will generally suffer fewer 'surprises' in program results if their
economic models of farming behaviour include an adequate recognition of farming risks and
farmers' attitudes toward them." Where farmers' risk preferences are non neutral, policies
seeking to achieve production abatement or expansion, or environmental protection may be
better achieved through affecting the farmer's risk environment. Knowledge of risk
preferences facilitates understanding of policy on producer choices and is important in
evaluating the consequences and merits of alternative policy measures. For example, ex ante
forecasting of how uncertainty and irreversibility are likely to affect producers'
responsiveness to agricultural technologies has implications for the design of environmental
policies (Purvis et al, 1995; Oglethorp, 1995; Leathers and Quiggen, 1991). Likewise, risk
management policy options are currently being considered to address the major criticisms
with the existing system of commodity programs and deficiency payments in the U.S.
(Chaherli and Babcock, 1995).
It is contended that the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient (AP), defined as
-U"(x)/U'(x), has been reported in the literature without due consideration to the effect of the
range and scale of the data on the coefficient. Scale of the outcome variable is affected by
units of measurement (currencies, measures of pollution, etc..) and also inflation. Range of
the outcome variable (ie. the magnitude of risk) is important because economic agents may
differ in their attitudes towards small risks relative to large risks. Consequently, the
magnitude of AP's conveys little information in the absence of a description of the stochastic
distribution for which they are elicited.
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Although agricultural economists appear to be well informed of the scale problem and
Raskin and Cochran's (1986) theorems to adjust AP's for the scale of the data, the effect of the
range of the data on AP's is less widely recognised and methodology for appropriately
adjusting the AP has yet to be developed. This is highly evident in the literature where AP's
are frequently reported with insufficient information to allow for appropriate adjustments for
the range of the data; and previously elicited AP's have been employed in secondary studies
without appropriate adjustment for the range of the data in the new study. To prove
inappropriate comparison of AP's within a study or incorrect adjustment of AP's between
studies is often impossible because adequate description of the stochastic income
distributions is seldom reported. Two recent examples are, however, identified, which serve
to confirm that informing economists of the effect of data range on AP's and developing
methodology to adjust AP's for both the range and scale of the data are both important goals
for research.
The specific objectives of this study are: a) to demonstrate the impacts of the scale and
range of the data on AP's and to develop a methodology to standardise the expression of risk
preferences, rendering it comparable across studies and utilisable in secondary studies
without requiring prior adjustment; b) to elicit farmers' risk preferences and empirically
analyse how risk characteristics affect revealed risk preferences; and c) to analyse the role of
farmers' risk preferences in their soil conservation decisions from an economic perspective.
The analysis has six distinct features:
* it develops a conceptual framework of farmers' soil conservation decisions, based on
the demand for soil conservation, within the expected utility framework;
* it develops an approach to adjust the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient
(AP) for both the scale and the range of the data;
* it uses a direct elicitation of utility (DEU) approach to elicit individual risk
preferences over a series of hypothetical, dichotomous lotteries considered separately,
systematically varying the level of monetary payoff to assess this effect on the pattern
of revealed risk preferences;
* it analyses the distribution and structure of revealed risk preferences in the study
population. Factors affecting revealed risk preferences are also examined;
* it assesses intra-field soil conservation efficiency of sugarcane farms through use of
technological information specific to sugarcane farming. This provides scope for
analysis of intra-farm variation in soil conservation efficiency and soil conservation
decisions; and
* it uses micro-level data to test hypotheses regarding factors that affect sugarcane
farmers' soil conservation decisions. Decisions are analysed in terms of soil
conservation efficiency, and adoption of alternative soil conservation measures.
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The analysis begins with a review of soil conservation models conceptualised in
previous economic studies. Studies of both farmers' decisions to adopt soil conservation
practices and those of farmers' achieved soil conservation efficiency are considered. A
striking feature of these studies is that sound economic models are seldom conceptualised.
The former set of studies usually conceptualize adoption of a soil conservation practices as a
stimulus - response situation, where at or above a threshold level there is a response to adopt.
Soil conservation efficiency models conceptualise soil conservation decisions as a
psychological process starting with recognition of erosion, followed by a decision to adopt or
not adopt soil conservation and the resultant consequences of the decision.
A sound economic framework for conceptualising soil conservation decisions in this
study is provided by considering soil conservation measures as inputs in agricultural
production, where the demand for these soil conservation measures is derived from the
demand for the product. Accordingly, farmers adopt that bundle of soil conservation
practices, and associated level of soil conservation efficiency, that maximises their expected
utility. This framework is used to derive conceptual models for the analysis of both farmers'
choices of soil conservation measures and their achieved soil conservation efficiency.
Because the research objectives require that farmers' attitudes towards risk be elicited,
the analysis proceeds to consider measures of risk preference within the expected utility
framework, in particular the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient. Although some
researchers (eg. Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992) have adjusted measurements of risk
preferences for the range of the data, these measures cannot be directly applied to stochastic
efficiency techniques. From Pratt's (1964) derivation of the coefficient, it is demonstrated
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why the coefficient is sensitive to both the range and the scale of the data describing the risk
situation. Examples of inappropriate reporting of AP's in previous research and inappropriate
borrowing of AP's for use in secondary research are used to illustrate the significance of this
finding. This result is further used to explain the difference between the relative risk aversion
and Frisch coefficients.
Next, Raskin and Cochran's (1986) theorems are examined and an amendment is
proposed to their first theorem to allow AP's to be adjusted for the range as well as the scale
of the data. This amendment, although useful, is not ideal since not all risk situations may be
described in monetary terms, for example health risks. Two approaches are subsequently
suggested for reporting risk preferences: the first, similar to that proposed by Babcock et al
(1993) entails adjusting the data to uniform range and scale prior to calculating an "adjusted
absolute risk aversion" coefficient. This approach may be extended to multivariate utility
analysis. The second approach, which is analogous to the first, requires reporting marginal
utilities, normalised through expression as a percent of total utility, to provide a feel for risk
preference.
A review of the empirical studies of farmers' soil conservation decisions and those
eliciting farmers' risk preferences describes several aspects of problems encountered in past
research. Despite considerable research, statistical results of the former branch of research
are, without exception, poor, indicating that agricultural economists understand little about
farmers' soil conservation decisions.
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Despite consensus amongst authors of these studies that measures of soil conservation
should be objective, reflect both effectiveness and extensiveness of whole farm achieved soil
conservation, and allow for relative analysis; a striking feature of this body of literature is that
soil conservation is measured differently in almost all studies. Despite progress, no measures
have yet met all these criteria. Furthermore, these studies have all defined measures of whole
farm soil conservation, neglecting potentially important information contained in intra-farm
variations in soil conservation decisions.
New research should either attempt to improve on the previous approach, try a new
approach, or, like this study, do both. Firstly, in this study, soil conservation efficiency is
assessed over a unit of land, sufficiently small to be considered homogenous in both soil
conservation adoption (the soil conservation measures used on that land) and soil
conservation effort (the quality of soil conservation on that land). Information on intra-farm
variations in soil conservation decisions, and hence extensiveness of whole farm soil
conservation, is captured through multiple observations of soil conservation decisions from
each farm. Secondly, soil conservation effort is objectively assessed relative to the
requirements of the 1983 Act using technological information.
The review of empirical research on risk preferences reveals that several analytical
methods have been developed to elicit risk preferences. The relative merits of each approach
are discussed. It is demonstrated that failure to adjust AP's for the range of the data has
caused problems for researchers when interpreting results of these studies. Most available
literature indicates that a majority of farmers are risk averse, however, there is a wide range of
risk preferences.
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To relate the conceptual model of farmers' soil conservation decisions with what is
known about their soil conservation decision-making environment and to evaluate the
feasibility of implementing the model, chapter 4 provides information on the study
population, soil conservation practices applicable to land under sugarcane, and soil
conservation legislation in South Africa. This information was taken into account in
specifying the research methodology.
To meet the empirical needs of the specified econometric models , a survey was
developed eliciting farmers' risk preferences, soil conservation decisions and other data
requirements. A direct elicitation of utility (DEU) through preset choices approach is
employed to elicit farmers' risk preferences. Certainty equivalents are elicited for five
hypothetical lotteries considered separately, systematically varying the level of monetary
payoffs in order to assess this effect on revealed risk preferences. Information on adoption of
soil conservation practices was elicited for both respondent's relatively steep and average
gradient slopes for the land they operate to capture information on intra-farm variations in
soil conservation decisions. Survey respondents were also asked their assessments of their
own soil conservation to analyse farmers' abilities to assess soil conservation. A sample of 53
commercial sugarcane farmers from KwaZulu-Natal was surveyed by personal interview to
provide data for the study. Principal components analyses and multiple regression techniques
are used to analyse the data.
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This thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter 2 presents a conceptual model of
farmers' soil conservation decisions and develops an approach to adjusting AP's for both the
scale and the range of the data. Chapter 3 reviews empirical evidence of each of the
components considered in the conceptual framework. Chapter 4 describes the study
population, soil conservation practices applicable to land under sugarcane, and soil
conservation policy in South Africa. Chapter 5 presents the methodology used for assessing
and analysing farmers' risk preferences and their soil conservation decisions, as well as the
data collection process and descriptive statistics. The results of these analyses are reported
and discussed in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes by discussing implications of these findings
for policy as well as for further research.
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2. CONCEPTUAL MODELS
This chapter, much like most of the other chapters in this thesis, and for that matter
this research, is divided into a section on farmers' risk preferences and another on farmers'
soil conservation decisions. As explained in the previous chapter, these branches of research
are connected through the research objective of determining the link(s), if any, between risk
preferences and soil conservation decisions. Each of these sections requires separate
conceptualisation, although within the same conceptual framework. Conceptual models
describing farmers' soil conservation decisions and their risk preferences are presented in
sections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively, both are contained within the expected utility framework.
2.1 A Conceptual Framework of Farmers' Soil Conservation Decisions
A striking feature of previous research on farmers' soil conservation decisions is that
sound economic models of farmers' soil conservation decisions are seldom conceptualised.
Section 2.1.1 presents a review and discussion of conceptual models used in previous
economic research of farmers' soil conservation decisions.
The basic rationale for the conceptual exposition developed in this section is that soil
conservation is an input in farming, and because soil conservation is achieved through the
adoption of soil conservation practices, the demand for soil conservation practices is derived
from the demand for the output, the production function and supply conditions of other
factors. This is explored in section 2.1.2. Section 2.1.3 develops this description in formal
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terms within the expected utility framework. Soil conservation decisions are conceptualised
in a model analogous to an input demand system. This model accounts for adoption of soil
conservation technologies and interrelations between soil conservation technologies, the
processes of implementing adoption decisions, and achieved soil conservation efficiency.
2.1.1 A Review of Soil Conservation Decision Studies
Soil conservation decision studies can be categorised as those analysing the adoption
of soil conservation practices and those analysing achieved soil conservation effectiveness.
Adoption of Soil Conservation Practices.
Considerable research has been conducted on adoption of new technologies by
agricultural producers. In general, these studies have focused on either a single technology or
on a set of new technologies considered as a single unit. Adoption decisions are essentially
conceptualised as stimulus - response situations where at or above a threshold level there is a
response to adopt. The discrete nature of the decision and the varying nature of the threshold
generate a non linear frequency distribution of the response. Bivariate probability models are
used to analyse observed behaviour. Examples of soil conservation studies using this
approach include Belknap and Saupe (1988), Rahm and Huffman (1984), Young and Shortel
(1984), Van Vuuren et al (1995), and Traore et al (1998). These models are best suited to
understanding adoption rather than erosion control, since adoption does not necessarily
correspond to effectiveness or extensiveness of use (Ervin and Ervin, 1982).
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Formal derivation of these bivariate technology adoption probability models are
derived in Rahm and Huffman (1984), from expected utility theory, and Featherstone and
Goodwin (1993), from a present value decision model. Because a present value decision
model only works well when anticipated costs and revenues from a prospective investment
are relatively certain, and when sunk costs are reversible or insignificant (Purvis et al, 1995),
and secondly, past research suggests that non pecuniary factors such as altruism (Colman,
1994), environmental quality (Bergstroom, 1989; Napier and Brown, 1993; Supalla et al,
1995 amongst others), peer pressure, or risk of prosecution for not meeting legislated
requirements may significantly affect farmers' conservation decisions, it is argued that a
conceptual model based on expected utility theory is more appropriate for the analysis of soil
conservation decisions.
A shortcoming of these studies is that they treat adoption as a discrete phenomenon
rather than a continuous one. Consequently, two farmers who have adopted a particular
practice on ten and one hundred percent of their land respectively are considered to be equal
adopters of that practice. Lee and Stewart (1983) demonstrated the use of a logit scale of the
proportion of land units with that practice (in their case minimum tillage) adopted within a
regression framework to elude this problem. Similarly, Featherstone and Goodwin (1993)
used total annual expenditure on long-term conservation measures to provide a continuous
measure approximating adoption of long-term soil conservation measures, which necessitated
estimation using a simultaneous equations Tobit model.
A second criticism is that these studies usually fail to consider interrelationships
between the adoption of different technologies, eg. van Vuuren et al (1995) considered six
annual conservation practices independently of each other in bivariate logit models, and
Featherstone and Goodwin (1993) aggregated expenditure across all long-term conservation
investments. Soil conservation is achieved through the adoption of a set of soil practices and
technologies which results in benefits of reduced soil erosion. This set, or bundle, of
technologies is chosen not as a single input to be used or ignored but instead as one potential
bundle out of which the producer could choose from some larger set of soil conservation
technology bundles. Thus the adoption arena is an inherently multivariate one, and
attempting univariate modelling excludes useful economic information contained in
interrelated and simultaneous adoption decisions (Dorfman, 1996). The author is not aware
of any research that has considered interrelationships between soil conservation practices.
Adoption of Soil Conservation per se
This second body of literature analyses the adoption of soil conservation as opposed to
adoption of soil conservation technologies, eg. Ervin and Ervin (1982), Sindin and King
(1990), Barlow and Nieuwoudt (1995) and Lynne et al (1988). The adoption decision is
usually conceptualised as a process with three components: (1) antecedents (recognition of an
erosion problem), (2) the adoption process (a decision whether or not to adopt soil
conservation practice(s)), and (3) consequences (achieved soil conservation effectiveness).
Separation into three (or more) stages serves to simplify the continuous and dynamic decision
process (Sinden and King, 1990).
19
The second stage is conceptually equivalent to the soil conservation technology
adoption studies considered in the previous section. Analysis of achieved conservation
effectiveness, the third stage, is important if the ultimate goal of conservation policy is
erosion reduction (Ervin and Ervin, 1982). A weakness of this body of literature is that a
sound economic foundation to this conceptualization is predominantly absent.
The objective of these studies is to delineate significant determinants associated with
adoption of a (bundle of) soil conservation practice(s). The adoption decision stages tend to
be specified as functions of producer, physical, socio-economic, financial, and institutional
characteristics. The three stages are usually estimated separately rather than sequentially or
simultaneously because the final decision stage may occur a considerable period after the
recognition stage and the separate effects of factors at each stage are usually of interest
(Sinden and King, 1990). Definition and measurement of the dependent variables is
uncertain, reflected in the lack of uniformity in their definition and measurement across these
studies.
The two bodies of literature reviewed in this section both analyse farmers' soil
conservation decisions. The first focuses on factors affecting the adoption of individual
practices. The second focuses on the process of soil conservation decisions and consequently
considers the adoption stage as an aggregate adoption of practices. If the ultimate goal of
conservation policy is erosion reduction, then research must focus on achieved soil
conservation efficiency and not technology adoption. Although the second approach is
consequently more useful from a policy perspective, it however lacks sound economic
foundation.
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Based on the common point between the two categories of soil conservation studies, a
theoretical link between the conceptual models is necessary to allow extension of the
expected utility framework of the technology adoption studies to the process of soil
conservation decisions. The next section considers the relationship between the demands for
soil conservation and soil conservation practices as a bridge to this gap.
2.1.2 The Demand for Soil Conservation
A plausible model describing soil conservation decisions should, perhaps, begin by
considering the demand for soil conservation to ensure a sound economic foundation. The
link between demand for the product and demand for a factor of production is closest when
the factor required is ridgedly and technically linked to the amount of product (Friedman,
1976: 153). Soil conservation is achieved through the adoption of soil conservation practices,
ergo the demand for soil conservation practices is derived from the demand for the product.
Although government legislation by way of the 1983 Act is designed to impose minimum
constraints on the quantity of soil conservation demanded by farmers through imposing ex
ante requirements enforced by ex post penalties, contraventions have been treated leniently
(Adler, 1985; Maher quoted in Fitz-Gerald, 1996). Consequently, it is expected that
government legislation has not played a large role in South African commercial sugarcane
farmers' demands for soil conservation.
Demand for an uncertain outcome (soil conservation) depends on: (a) the farmer's
subjective utility function of income, wealth, environmental quality and other attributes
associated with soil conservation, eg. aesthetic appearance of land and compliance with laws;
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(b) his subjective frequency distributions of future income, wealth and environmental quality;
(c) the changes in these frequency distributions generated by the adoption of soil conservation
technologie(s); (d) the cost of soil conservation; and (e) other factors and constraints to
quantity of soil conservation demanded eg. competing uses for available resources and
government enforced soil conservation requirements. The long term nature of implementing
soil conservation decisions may constrain achieved soil conservation from equalling
demanded soil conservation.
2.1.3 A Conceptual Model of Soil Conservation Decisions
The movement towards soil conservation is generally accomplished by the adoption of
a combination of technologies which result in benefits of reduced soil erosion. This set of
technologies is not chosen as a single input to be used or ignored but instead a one potential
bundle out of many such bundles of soil conservation technologies which the producer could
choose from some larger set. Thus the adoption decision is an inherently multivariate one,
and attempting univariate modelling excludes useful economic information contained in
interdependent and simultaneous adoption decisions.
Because soil conservation adoption and effort may vary within individual farms, soil
conservation is defined specific to areas sufficiently small that adoption of a technology
bundle may be represented as a discrete decision, resulting in the choice variable being of a
qualitative nature. Extensiveness of whole farm soil conservation may be captured by
recording multiple measurements for each farm. To capture the true nature of the decision
process, all possible combinations of technology bundles of interest should be included in the
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decision set. If each technology bundle is thought of as a possible adoption decision by the
farmer, the farmer will be expected to choose the one that maximises his expected utility.
Adoption of Soil Conservation Technology Bundles
The decision environment is represented in a probabilistic choice system (PCS). A
PCS is defined in terms of a set of indexing alternatives, I; the finite choice sets from I, B; the
measured and observed attributes of the alternatives, Z; and the measured and observed
characteristics of the individuals, S. A utility function is assumed that accounts for a vector
of probabilistic differences in tastes between individuals, (i, depending o n s e S . It is further
assumed that variation in demand within the population is accounted for by differences in
tastes between individuals. Through consideration of the cumulative density function of
tastes in the population and application of the hypothesis of random utility maximization, a
multivariate qualitative response probability model of individuals decisions may be derived.
The choice probability P(i|b,s) specifies the probability of choosing i e I, given that a
decision must be made from the choice set b e B and the decision maker has characteristics s
e S. A PCS is analogous to a conventional econometric specification of a demand system,
with the functional specification of the demand structure and the distribution of errors
combined to specify the distribution of demand (McFadden, 1981).
If B is the set of soil conservation technology bundles and K is a vector of constraints
to adoption of B (eg. climate, suitability to sugarcane), then consider a choice set b =
{0,1,. ..,m} e B of the soil conservation technology bundles available for intra-panel soil
conservation on sugarcane panels within the population. By convention, technology bundle
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zero will represent adoption of none of the technologies being studied. Identification is
accomplished relative to this technology bundle.
Alternative i has a column vector of observed attributes Zt that describe and an
associated utility U; = a'Zi5 where a is a vector of taste weights. Zt describes both the
distribution of net returns (both current and future) and other attributes (for example
environmental quality and aesthetic appearance of the farm) to technology bundle /. Assume
a to have a parametric probability distribution with parametric vector 0, and let P = P(0) and
Q = Q(6) denote the mean and variance of a. Let zb = (z,,...,zm) denote the array of observed
attributes of the available alternatives. Then the vector of utilities ub = (u,,...,um) has a
multivariate probability distribution with mean P'zb and covariance matrix z'bQzb. Thus
U - a ' Z . + e, ...(2.1)
According to the random utility maximization hypothesis, choice is determined by
maximising expected utility, ie. the individual adopts the zth technology bundle if U; > Uj for j
e b. The qualitative variable D; indexes the decision: Dj = 1 if U; > Uj (the technology is
adopted), and D( = 0 if Uj < Uj (the technology is not adopted).
The probability, P(i|b,s), that D, is equal to one can be expressed as a function of a:
P(i|b,s) =Pr(D,= l) = Pr(Ui^UJ)
= Pr( aZj + e, > aZj + e )̂





#) is a probability function, Uy is a random disturbance term, D: = Z} - Zj is a
coefficient vector, and F(aX|) is the cumulative distribution function F evaluated at aXt.
Thus the choice probability P(i|b,s) for alternative / then equals the probability of drawing a
vector ub from this distribution such that u( > Uj for j e B.
The vector of attributes z{ of an alternative in this formation is a function of the raw
data (q,w,,r,s) where (q,w;) measure characteristics of the alternative and (r,s) characteristics
of the individual and the background economic environment. Since any continuous utility
function can be approximated on a compact set to any desired degree of accuracy by an
appropriate linear specification, and z( can incorporate complex transformations and
interactions of the raw data, there is virtually no loss of generality in assuming the utility
structure Uj = a'Zj.
Adoption of Soil Conservation Technologies
If n > 2, ie. there is more than one technology (and hence greater than two technology
bundles), analysis of adoption of technology bundles requires a multivariate analysis to
consider possible interrelationships between adoption of different soil conservation practices.
The issue of interrelated practices has important implications for statistical modelling in
adoption studies. A multivariate qualitative response (QR) model specifies the joint
probability distribution of two or more discrete dependant variables. Assuming that adoption
of one soil conservation practice on a panel does not preclude or necessitate adoption of a
different soil conservation practice on that same panel, the relationship between the number
of soil conservation practices that may be adopted on that panel, s, and the number of possible
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soil conservation technology bundles that could be adopted on that panel, b, is provided by:
t'Bb = _
...(2.3)
For simplicity, consider n =2 (therefore b = 4): The joint distribution can be described















Then, assuming that each choice is made according to a binary probit model, P(n, = 1)
= ^(p'jx) and P(n2 = 1) = <£(P'2x). Having specified the probabilities of n, and n2, the
multivariate model is completed by specifying the joint probability P(n, = 1, n2 = 1), which in
turn is determined if the joint distribution of n*, and n*2 is specified. If it is assumed that they
are jointly normal with a correlation coefficient p, then P(s, = 1, s2 = 1) = Fp(P',x,p'2x), where
Fp denotes the bivariate normal distribution function with zero means, unit variances, and
correlation p.
The model conceptualised has thus far extended the soil conservation technology
adoption model to a multivariate setting that accounts for interrelationships between soil
conservation practices, including the process of adoption. The next section adapts the model
to focus on achieved soil conservation instead of soil conservation technologies.
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Adoption of Soil Conservation
Through assuming that all soil conservation practices are perceived by farmers to be
essentially similar, the above multivariate QR model may be reduced to an ordered
multinominal QR model for a single dependant variable, NPRAC, equal to the number of soil
conservation practices adopted. If n is large, NPRAC may be assumed continuous, although
bounded between zero (no soil conservation practices adopted) and n (all soil conservation
practices adopted). NPRAC is a measurement of soil conservation adoption, similar to that
used by Ervin and Ervin (1982).
If it is further assumed that farmers perceive soil conservation efficiency and other
attributes achieved through adoption of any g, g < n, soil conservation practices is equivalent
to that achieved from adoption of g different soil conservation practices, then farmers'
demand for soil conservation affects only the number of soil conservation practices which
they adopt. Thus, NPRAC on the/th field of the zth farmer may be postulated to be a linear
relationship of X^ and a zero mean disturbance term, e :̂
NPRACy = XyTi + ei:j; s.t. 0 < NPRAC < n ...(2.4)
The assumption that farmers perceive all technologies are similar is considered
reasonable when, firstly, the primary attribute of all technologies is assumed to be soil
conservation and secondly, all technology adoption decisions may be represented using
dichotomous variables.
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However, because soil conservation practices do vary in their contribution to soil
conservation efficiency, the previous assumption is relaxed. Instead it is assumed that
farmers can correctly assess achieved soil conservation efficiency, EFFORT, however other
attributes are not important. This assumption is reasonable if soil conservation is the primary
attribute of all soil conservation practices. Farmers will then adopt soil conservation practices
due to their demand for soil conservation. Consequently, farmers' achieved soil conservation
efficiency is postulated to be a linear relationship of X^ and a zero mean disturbance term, e :̂
EFFORT^ XijV + ey ...(2.5)
where EFFORT is a continuous measure of the zth farmers' soil conservation effort on his/her
jth sugarcane field. Thus the demand for soil conservation is specified as a function of the
attributes of soil conservation and the decision maker's tastes and decision making
environments. This reflects that the demand for the final product is a joint demand for all the
inputs.
2.1.4 Implications
This section developed a conceptual framework investigating farmers soil
conservation decisions. The model is derived from expected utility theory and is analogous to
a demand system for soil conservation and soil conservation technologies. It provides scope
for analyses of interrelationships between soil conservation practices and of the adoption
process.
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This model does not reject the concept of a decision process conceptualised in studies
such as those reviewed in section 2.1.1. It recognises that a change in decision may stem
from any factor that affects the demand for soil conservation. For example, recognition of a
soil conservation problem may affect the farmer's subjective relative price of soil loss; or
increased environmental awareness is an example of a change in taste. Clearly, analysis of
what causes change in awareness of perceptions is important, however such analysis falls
within the domain of sociology and psychology rather than economics.
An advantage of this model is that it considers soil conservation decisions from
adoption of technologies to adoption of soil conservation per se and the process of
implementing adoption decisions. This provides scope for analysis of how factors affect soil
conservation. The next chapter reviews empirical studies of farmers' soil conservation. This
will provide insight to methodology required for analysis of soil conservation decisions. The
focus of this chapter, however, now shifts to conceptualising a model of risk preferences.
2.2 A Conceptual Model for Risk Preferences Analysis
Most models of decision making under risk require knowledge of decision makers'
risk preferences. This is true for both positive applications of risk theory that explain or
predict behaviour under uncertainty for purposes of policy evaluation, and for normative
approaches which advise decision makers which decisions they should make given their risk
preferences. Risk aversion is a purely ordinal notation and is a property of risk preference
analysis. Bernoulian models have been the mainstay of economic risk analyses and are based
on the assumption that decision makers behave as if they maximise the mathematical
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expectation of utility, where utility is a function of the outcome variables and heuristics of the
probability distributions. Hence, risk may be defined as a vector of variance, skewness,
kurtosis and other higher moments of the probability distributions (Young, 1979; Buschena
and Zilberman, 1994).
Expected utility (EU) models view decision making under risk as a choice between
alternatives, each associated with probability distributions. Decision makers are assumed to
have a preference ordering defined over the probability distribution for which the axioms of
ordering, transitivity, continuity and independence are assumed to hold. Risky alternatives
can be evaluated under these assumptions using the EU preference function (Buschena and
Zilberman, 1994; Pope, 1982). The expected utility hypothesis (EUH) states that choices
made under uncertainty are effected by the decision maker's preferences and expectations,
and it provides a general decision rule - expected utility maximisation - which integrates
information on these two factors to identify preferred choices (King and Robison, 1981).
Despite documented failings of expected utility and generalised expected utility
frameworks (see Pope, 1982; Bar-Shira, 1992; Pratt, 1964; and Buschena and Zilberman,
1994, amongst others) both Pope (1982) and Robison (1982) concluded that EU is a useful,
albeit not perfect, rational model of individual behaviour that describes a representative
decision maker. Bar-Shira (1992) developed a nonparametric test of EUH but in most cases
was unable to reject the hypothesis. He concluded that inconsistency with EU maximization
is likely to be more common in laboratory experiments than in reality. This reflects the views
of Pratt (1964). Most of the violations of expected utility hypothesis have been obtained with
carefully planned experiments, thus it is unclear whether such violations should prohibit use
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of the expected utility hypothesis when studying real-world decisions (Bar-Shira et al, 1997).
The general consensus from the literature is that EU is a good starting point for analysis under
risk.
Section 2.2.1 discusses measurements of risk preference within the expected utility
framework, concluding that the AP is appropriate, except that it is sensitive to both the scale
and the range of the data. This chapter proceeds to develop an approach for adjusting the AP
appropriately.
2.2.1 Measures of Risk Preferences
EU theory essentially defines risk aversion in terms of the concavity or convexity of
the decision-maker's utility function at any particular point. Friedman and Savage (1948)
showed that the local concavity or convexity of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function,
u(x), indicates the local risk preference of the decision maker. A decision maker is described
as locally risk averse, risk neutral or risk loving for a particular outcome level if u"(x) <0, =0,
or >0 respectively, where u"(x) is the second derivative of u(«) with respect to outcomes
(Machina, 1982). This measure merely indicates a decision makers risk preference, but is not
an appropriate measure of risk aversion as u"(x) is affected by linear transformations of x,
and consequently its magnitude provides no insight into the severity of risk attitudes (Pratt,
1964).
Arrow (1974) and Pratt (1964) independently developed equivalent measures of risk
preferences that allow for comparison of interpersonal preferences - the Arrow-Pratt absolute
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and relative risk aversion coefficients (r(x) or AP and RR respectively). Arrow developed
them from the probability premium (Babcock et al, 1993), whilst Pratt worked from the risk
premium (Pratt, 1964). A third and related measure of risk aversion, the partial risk aversion
coefficient (PR), was developed by Menzes and Hansen (1970). These measures are invariant
to positive linear transformations of x. A decision maker is defined a risk averse, risk neutral,
or risk loving respectively if these measures are less than, equal to, or greater that zero
(Menzes and Hansen, 1970; Pratt, 1964).
2.2.2 The Arrow-Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient
The Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient (AP), defined as -u"(x)/u'(x), has
appeared extensively in the literature. Although AP's are invariant to linear transformations
of U, they are not invariant to arbitrary rescalings of x or changes in the range of x, rendering
AP's neither employable in secondary studies, nor comparable between studies without prior
adjustment.
The impact of both scale and range on r(x) is perhaps best demonstrated using the
initial work of Pratt. Pratt (1964, p. 125) developed a relationship between the risk premium,
the variance of the risky prospect and r(x) as being: I1(X>Y) - 0.5a2 Yr(x) + o(o
2
Y), where
[|(x,Y) is the risk premium given a level of wealth and a risky prospect Y, o2Y is the variance
of the risky prospect, r(x) is the AP at level of wealth x, and o(o2Y) are the higher order terms
in the Taylor series expansion of the expected utility function around a mean of x. By
rearranging the above expression to make r(x) the subject yields: r(x) = 2[JI(x,Y) -
o(o2Y)]/o
2
Y. Following Tsaing (1972), if the dispersion of the risk prospect is assumed small
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relative to wealth, then the term o(o2Y)/a
2
Y may be neglected. Thus r(x) is approximately
given by r(x) ~ 2]j[(x,Y)/a2Y. (Note: this exposition is similar to that presented by McCarl
and Bessler (1989) as part of their discussion on estimating an upper bound on the AP when
the utility function is unknown).
These exact and approximate expressions of r(x) clearly indicate that r(x) is dependant
upon both x and the risk situation, Y. Thus, the AP has associated with it a unit, the
reciprocal of the unit with which Y is measured since the certainty equivalent is divided by
the variance of Y. Because o2Y and not E[Y] affects r(x), the magnitude of AP is not affected
by the use of incremental rather than absolute returns, or vice versa. Furthermore, it is
apparent that a change in o2Y will affect r(x). For example, a mean preserving increase in
risk, ie. o2Y increases whilst x and the expected value of Y remain constant, will decrease
r(x).
This discussion provides an explanation to McCarl's (1987) concern that if the
magnitude of the AP is unaffected by use of incremental rather than absolute returns, as
hypothesised by Raskin and Cochran (1986), then one could abandon the wealth concept and
only look at income. Cochran and Raskin's (1987) reply agrees with McCarl, but writes off
the anomaly as "an exercise in miscommunication" without explaining how AP's are a
function of both initial wealth and stochastic income.
Given the sensitivity of AP to the scale of the data as well as the range of the data it is
somewhat surprising that AP's have appeared in so many publications without also providing
sufficient information about the source of the AP coefficients or the range and scale of
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stochastic wealth to allow comparisons with other studies (Cochran et al, 1985; Collender
and Zilberman, 1985; Danok et al, 1980; Holt and Brandt, 1985; King & Oamek, 1983; King
& Robison, 1981; King & Lybecker, 1983; Kramer & Pope, 1981; Lemieux et al, 1982; Love
and Buccola, 1991; Love & Robison, 1984; Meyer, 1977; Rister et al, 1984; Tauer, 1985;
Tauer, 1986; Wilson & Eidman, 1985; Ye and Yeh, 1995; Zacharias & Grube, 1984). A
nonexaustive selection of reported values of AP's, many post Raskin and Cochran's (1986)
paper, is presented in Table 2.2 to demonstrate the continued inconsistencies in magnitudes of
elicited values.





















































AP's are expressed in several studies to five decimal places (in one study to nine and
in another to seven), and range from 12.17 (Chavas and Holdt, 1996) and 6.0 (Meyer, 1977)
to .000000921 (Collender and Zilberman, 1985). Cochran (1986 p. 120) states "it appears
reasonable to expect that the preferences of a majority of farmers will be represented with the
interval -.0002 to .0015, when measured at after tax net farm annual income levels".
However, Raskin and Cochran (1986) show that the relatively close values for AP of 0.0002
and 0.0003 yield a three fold difference on the marginal utility of the 10,001st dollar, and a
160 fold difference on the 50,001st dollar (Table 2, p. 206). Therefore, scale is very
important.
Perhaps more surprising is the number of studies that have assumed AP values or used
AP values from other studies as secondary data without adjusting appropriately for the scale
and range of the data used in the primary study (eg. McSweeny and Kramer, 1986; Babcock
et al, 1987; Lambert, 1990; Williams et al, 1993; Johnson and Foster, 1994; Backus et al,
1995 and Blakslee and Lone, 1995). Babcock et al (1993) provides a useful discussion on the
need to consider the proportion of wealth at risk when selecting appropriate AP coefficients
for examining the affect of risk preference on decisions. Subsequently, some researches (eg.
Babcock and Hennessey, 1996) have selected AP's according to reasonable risk premia,
whilst others (eg. Feuz et al, 1995) have been careful to compare elicited AP coefficients with
those elicited for similar income distributions in previous research.
To prove that AP's are used incorrectly is impossible in most studies because
information on the stochastic income distributions from which the AP's are elicited and
applied tends to be inadequately provided. Nevertheless, two recent examples of misuse are
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identified: Botes et al (1994) and Simmons and Rambaldi (1997). The first study, which is
reviewed in detail in the following chapter, compared APrs elicited for different stochastic
income distributions according to their expected values and not the magnitudes of risk
inferred by the distributions. As a consequence conclusions drawn on the structure of risk
preferences within their study population may be incorrect. Simmons and Rambaldi (1997)
adjusted average AP's elicited in Bond and Wonder (1980) according to the ratio of expected
value of the stochastic income distribution of their study to those of the respective lotteries
described in Bond and Wonder (1980). The procedure used is detailed on Simmons and
Rambaldi (1997) p. 164. Their calculated value was 9.633E-08. Section 2.2.5 indicates that
AP's should instead be adjusted according to the ratio of standard deviations of the income
distributions. Standard deviations of the lotteries in Bond and Wonder are easily calculated.
If the distributions of wheat price and yield are assumed normally distributed and
independent, then using data provided in Simmons and Rambaldi (1997) Table 1, p. 163 it can
be calculated that the standard deviation of expected income is $430857. The recalculated
AP is equal to 3.484E-07: 3.6 times as large as that used by Simmons and Rambaldi (1997).
It is further noted that Simmons and Rambaldi (1997) calculated a n optimal hedging
ratio of zero using their calculated AP but found that a ten fold increase in AP resulted in a
hedge ratio of 0.81. This high level of sensitivity of their model to the assumed degree of
risk aversion suggests that incorrect adjustment of AP's in this study had an important
bearing on results and conclusions reached.
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2.2.3 The Relative and Partial Risk Aversion Coefficients
The relative risk aversion coefficient, defined as x.r(x), is the elasticity of the marginal
utility function and is unitless, however it is still susceptible to problems of marginal utility
and returns being expressed in incommensurable units (Raskin and Cochran, 1986). The
relative and partial risk aversion coefficients are more or less equivalent formulations of the
same concept. Both are elasticities, and as such are unit free. The former measures the rate at
which the utility of the outcome variable decreases with the level of that outcome variable,
whilst the latter measures the same but is conditional on a given level of wealth (Bardsley and
Harris, 1987). Consequently, the relative risk aversion coefficient is appropriate where both
the stochastic (income) and non stochastic (initial wealth) components of wealth are changing
proportionately, whereas the partial risk aversion coefficient is appropriate to describe
situations in which initial wealth is fixed and income is variable (Bar-Shira et al, 1997).
2.2.4 The Frisch Coefficient
The Frisch coefficient, w, is defined in equation (2.6) and is interpreted as the
flexibility of the marginal utility of money (Frisch, 1959, p. 183).
w = (6w/5a)(a/w) ...(2.6)
where w = marginal utility of money, and
a = total expenditure.
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Through mathematical manipulation of equation (2.6) Nieuwoudt and Hoag (1993)
demonstrate that:
w = u"(y)/u'(y).a, where y = money income,
.-.w = -a (Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient)
.-.w = -Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion coefficient ...(2.7)
Equation (2.7) demonstrates that the Frisch coefficient and the Arrow-Pratt relative
risk aversion coefficient are mathematically similar concepts. Both are elasticity concepts
and both relate to the marginal utility of money. Further, Frisch coefficient values tend to
range form -0.1 for the extremely wealthy to -10 for the extremely poor and apathetic, with -
2 for the middle income bracket (Frisch, 1959), which is similar to Arrow's hypothesis that
risk aversion is inversely related to wealth. However, risk preferences, and hence also risk
aversion coefficients, are expected to change in response to a wealth preserving change in
risk, whilst Frisch coefficient estimates for a population group tend to be similar across all
commodities. This anomaly arises through failure to express risk preference measures as a
function of the risk situation and emphasises the importance of providing sufficient
information when reporting risk preferences.
2.2.5 Adjusting AP's for the Range and Scale of the Data
Raskin and Cochran (1986 p. 206) propose the theorem that if there is "a
transformation of scale on x such that w = x/c,, where c, is a constant,..then r(w) = c,r(x),"
where r(x) = AP and x is the outcome variable. A second theorem (p. 207) shows that AP is
unaltered by a shift of the range. Thus if v = x + c2, where c2 is a constant, then r(v) = r(x).
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The following demonstrates that theorem 1 requires that a transformation in either
range or scale is independent of a shift in range. Consider a transformation such that w = x/c,
that induces a shift in range such that v = x + c2. From theorem 1, r(w) = c,r(x), and r(w) =
c3r(v), where c, = x/w and c3 = v/w = (x + c2)/w. Thus (x/w)r(x) = ((x + c2)/w)r(v). However,
from theorem 2, r(x) = r(v). This is true only if, c2 = 0, which demonstrates that a
transformation of range or scale must be independent of a shift in range.
The notion that range affects AP's is not new. Wiesensel and Schoney (1989), stated
that AP's elicited for different income levels are not directly comparable. The notion that
range affects AP's is also implied in McCarl and Dessler's (1989) approach to estimating an
upper bound on AP when the utility function is unknown. Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992)
suggested that risk preferences be measured as the ratio of the certainty equivalent to the
expected value of the income distribution to permit comparison of risk preferences across
lotteries of different range. Feinerman and Finkelshtain (1996) used a similar approach
based on the probability premium. These approaches have a drawback in that results cannot
be directly applied to some stochastic efficiency techniques, eg mean-variance programming
models and stochastic dominance with respect to a function. Babcock et al (1993) also note
that when the range of wealth distributions varies the risk premium, expressed as a proportion
of gamble size (amount of wealth at risk), and the probability premium convey more
information on risk preferences than does the AP. Consequently, they advocate consideration
of these measures when selecting AP coefficients to demonstrate the effects of risk
preferences on decisions. However, it is apparent from the range of AP's elicited, borrowed
and assumed, even in recent studies, that many agricultural economists are unaware of the
impact of range on AP's.
39
Section 2.2.2 indicated that AP's are not affected by the use of incremental rather than
absolute returns, which suggests that theorem 2 in Raskin and Cochran (1986) is correct.
However, it also demonstrates that o2Y and not E[Y] affects r(x). Consequently, the
conversion factor, c, in theorem 1 should be related to the standard deviations of x and w,
rather than their expected values. Hence in theorem 1, an amendment is proposed that c,
should equal ojow rather that x/w. Raskin and Cochran's first theorem may be applied if ox/x
= ojw, which is true for all scale transformations but is not necessarily true for range
transformations.
Despite this suggested amendment to Raskin and Cochran's first theorem, not all risk
situations may easily be adjusted to be represented in terms of dollar income or wealth to
enable comparison and analysis, for example environmental risks. An approach is suggested
entailing standardisation of the data to uniform scale and range prior to calculating an
"adjusted Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient" (A,*). For example, the negative
exponential utility function, U(x) = -exp{-Ax}, is assumed for simplicity since it has a
constant AP = X, and the distribution (xmjn < x < xmax) is converted into a distribution (0 < x*
< 1) where xmin and xmax are the minimum and maximum values on the x-scale.
Let x* = (x-xmin)/(xmax - xmjn)
•'• X ~~ Xmin X vXmax " X min)
where U(x) = -e"Xx and U(x') = -e"A*x'
•• •k* = Mxmax -
 xmin) since Xxmin = constant ...(2.8)
(Nieuwoudt and Hoag, 1993)
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This simple transformation to equation (2.8) provides a unitless expression of the
absolute risk aversion function, X*, by multiplying AP, X, by the range of x. Clearly, changes
in both the range and the scale of the data are accounted for. X* coefficients should then be
reported with details of the risk situation and population characteristics, including wealth, for
which they were elicited. Then, these local properties may be used to derive global properties
of risk preferences for populations. Researchers will then be able to select appropriate X*
coefficients for secondary studies or the interval approach to eliciting risk preferences, and
through knowledge of the new risk situation, may calculate appropriate X coefficients.
This approach may be extended to multivariate utility analysis. For example, the
bivariate negative exponential utility function, U(x,y) = -exp{-Ax} - exp{-0y} is standardised
according to x* = (x - xmm)/(xmax - xmj and y* = (y - ymm)/(ymax - ymm) to yield U*(x*,y*) = -exp{-
A.V} -c.exp{-0*y*}, where X* and 8* are the adjusted-AP's with respect to x and y, and c =
exp{-0[xmm]} / exp{-A[ymm]} (a constant). For example, it may be applied to environmental
analyses where, say, both wealth and environmental risks may be important. Elicited values
are consistent with the absolute risk aversion matrix, R, derived by Duncan (1977) (cited by
Jeffrey and Eidman (1991) and defined by:
_ \_ U^} _ -bU(x)/5x.bx. V i , j = l , 2 , . . . ,
L Ui J 5L7(x)/5x i ' x=(X 1 ,x 2 , . . .,Xn)
R provides a complete representation of an agent's risk preferences for multiple
attributes that is consistent with the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient. The
diagonal elements represent the agents absolute risk attitudes with respect to the rth risky
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attribute. The off-diagonal elements represent the agents attitudes towards risks involving
pairs of attributes. In the multivariate case, the risk premium is a function of all elements in
the ith row of R and the appropriate probability distributions. The general condition have not
yet been established that allow analysis to predict multivariate risk-averse or risk-preferring
behaviour based on the structure of R. However, If utility is additive (ie. U(x,, x2, ...,xn) =
SUj(Xj)) the off-diagonal elements of R are all zero and R is a diagonal matrix. Given this,
the approximate risk premium for the /th element is a function of the ith diagonal element of
R and the variance and higher orders of the probability distribution. Alternatively, if the
attributes are statistically independent then the covariances are zero and off-diagonal elements
do not impact on the risk aversion coefficient. The multivariate approach has been extended
to permit application of multivariate stochastic dominance techniques (Jeffrey and Eidman,
1991).
2.2.6 Marginal Utilities and Risk Preferences
Marginal utilities describe the choice situation and may be an answer to King's (1986)
concern that a major problem with using stochastic dominance with respect to a function
(SDWRF) is establishing an appropriate scale for measuring the absolute risk aversion. Table
2 in Raskin and Cochran (1986, p.206) shows that as the range of a risk situation increases, if
the AP is held constant the marginal utility changes and vice versa. Thus reporting MU's
provides a plausible feel for absolute risk aversion (Nieuwoudt and Hoag, 1993).
42
It may be instructive that the marginal utilities, used as weights, be reported for
SDWRF studies. This may provide other researchers with some information about the choice
situation. As shown in Table 2.3, marginal utility can be normalized, through expression as a
percent of total utility, to show the weight of a change in x. This is equivalent to adjusting x
to a unit distribution considered in the previous section. It is evident that relatively more risk
averse agents attach a greater (lower) weight to outcomes in the left (right) side of the
distribution, demonstrating decreasing marginal utility of the outcome variable under risk,
which characterises risk aversion.
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For instance, an agent with a certainty equivalent of 30 percent of the gamble range
has an absolute risk aversion coefficient equal to A* = 1.8 when the data are scaled from zero
to one. This assigns a weight of 19.74 to a unit on the 0% to 10% left extreme side of the
outcome distribution and a weight of 3.9 to a unit on the 90% to 100% right extreme side.
The area between two cumulative distribution functions (CDF's) to the right of a crossing
must thus be considerably larger than the area to the left of the crossing, for the right side area
to outweigh the left side area.
2.2.7 Summary and Implications
Whilst Raskin and Cochran (1986) have successfully made agricultural economists aware of
the effect of the scale of the data on the AP, many still seem unaware of the effect of range.
This discussion has focused on the abilities of the AP to convey information about risk
aversion assumptions or measurements in research programs. It is shown that an amendment
is necessary to Raskin and Cochran's first theorem if AP's are to be adjusted for the range as
well as the scale of the data. It is imperative that sufficient information regarding the risk
situation and the population are reported with elicited risk preferences.
Further, it appears important that risk preferences should be reported in a consistent
manner such that studies can easily be compared to one another. It is shown that rescaling the
data to a range of 0 < X* < 1 prior to calculating AP's, provides measures that can be
compared across studies, even where the risk situation cannot be easily described in monetary
terms.
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This result may give an explanation for empirical findings regarding the magnitudes
and structure of risk preferences of previous research, which is reviewed in second section of
the next chapter. In the first section of chapter 3, however, the focus of this thesis returns to
soil conservation, where empirical evidence from previous research of the impact of risk
preferences and other factors on farmers soil conservation decisions is reviewed.
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter presents a review of those studies providing empirical insights into the
issues raised in attempts to evaluate both factors affecting farmers' soil conservation decisions
and the elicitation and analysis of farmers' risk preferences. The body of literature pertaining
to soil conservation decisions is considered first in section 3.1, followed by that studying risk
preferences in section 3.2.
3.1 A Review of Soil Conservation Decision Research.
Studies of farmers' technology adoption decisions have developed along two main
branches. The first branch of the literature, reviewed in section 3.1.1, is concerned with
empirical identification of the factors of characteristics correlated with adoption decisions
and/or conduct analyses of factors affecting farmers' decisions using micro farm-level data.
The current study belongs to this branch. The second branch concerns itself with building
models of economic decision units faced with the possibility if adopting a new technology.
Economic theory is employed to derive theoretical results predicting the qualitative effect of
factors such as farm size, liquidity constraints, and risk attitudes on the decision to adopt or
not adopt the technology. A non exhaustive selection of the empirical research in trying to
understand farmers' soil conservation decisions from this branch is reviewed in section 3.1.2.
As far as this author is aware, Barlow (1995), is the only recent South African study of
soil conservation from an economic perspective. Therefore, the present research has relied
predominantly on soil conservation studies completed in the United States (U.S.).
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3.1.1 Behavioural Economic Studies of Soil Conservation Decisions
The objective of these studies is to delineate significant determinants associated with
adoption of (a bundle of) soil conservation (practices). Where adoption is conceptualized as a
process, the stages of adoption are usually estimated separately rather than sequentially or
simultaneously because the final decision stage may occur a considerable period after the
recognition stage and the separate effects of factors at each stage are usually of interest
(Sinden and King, 1990). The adoption decision stages tend to be specified as functions of
producer, physical, socio-economic, financial, and institutional characteristics. Sociological
and economic arguments are used to hypothesise relationships between these variables and
adoption of conservation structures. Besides consideration of farmers' risk preferences, this
discussion shall focus on how the dependant variables are defined, the empirical
methodologies used in these studies, and the empirical results obtained.
Although the conceptual model developed in section 2.1 of the previous chapter
integrated the demand for soil conservation technologies with the demand for soil
conservation to describe farmers' soil conservation decisions, previous research has treated
these areas of research separately. Consequently, literature reviewed from these branches of
research are presented in separate subsections: studies analysing soil conservation technology
adoption are considered next, followed by studies of soil conservation adoption in the
following section.
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Soil Conservation Technology Adoption Studies
Bultena and Hoiberg (1983) compared personal attributes of farm operators, farm
characteristics, attitudinal orientation of the farmer, and the potential for soil erosion among
early, late and non adopters of conservation tillage in Iowa. Farmers' risk preferences were
captured from a four item scale that measured propensity to risk taking. Results indicate that
older farmers and risk averse farmers are less likely to adopt minimum tillage. Farmers'
perceptions of local acceptance and adoption of minimum tillage was found to be important,
however, this may also approximate economic feasibility of adoption for the farming area.
Lee and Stewart (1983) analysed the relationship between landownership and the
adoption of minimum tillage by cropland farmers during 1977-78 using a sample of 7649
farmers from across the U.S. An interesting feature of this study is the approach to model the
explanatory variables using a logit scale in a linear model. Use of a logit scale allowed the
dependant variable to reflect both adoption and extensiveness of adoption of minimum tillage
on the landholdings, an improvement over earlier studies of technology adoption. Results
indicated regional effects are most important in explaining adoption of minimum tillage;
small operating size impedes adoption of minimum tillage more than separation of farm
ownership from operation; and that adoption of minimum tillage is more likely on less
erosive land, suggesting that soil conservation may be a secondary motivation in the adoption
of minimum tillage.
Young and Shortel (1984) used a bivariate probability model to examine factors
influencing adoption decisions of soil conservation structures using a sample of 14600 U.S.
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farmers. They hypothesised that factors affecting adoption of non-structural practices will
also affect the adoption of structural practices. A farmer was defined as an adopter if (s)he
had invested in a soil conservation structure between 1975 and 1977. The estimated model
showed poor fit of the data. Results indicate that younger male farmers with more education
are more likely to adopt soil conservation structures; there is an inverse relationship between
land rented out and conservation investments, although this relationship is offset when share
leases are used; and investment in other land improving measures are positively related to
investment in soil conservation structures, implying that land improvements are likely to be
installed as a package.
Rahm and Huffman (1984) presented a model of adoption behaviour founded on
maximisation of expected utility, from which they derived a probability of adoption model.
They defined efficiency of adoption to be the difference between actual adoption and the
estimated probability of adoption. Crossectional microdata from a survey of Iowa farms was
used to explain differences in Iowa farmers' adoption of reduced tillage. The dichotomous
definition of adoption of reduced tillage used fails to provide information on the
extensiveness of adoption. Human capital variables were excluded from the probability of
adoption model since adoption is not always feasible, but were included in an efficiency of
adoption model since they are expected to increases the probability of farmers making the
economically "correct" decision. Probit and linear regression techniques were used to
estimate the two stage adoption model. Estimated equations showed poor fit of the data (R2
statistics = 0.18 and 0.05). Results showed that the probability of adopting minimum tillage
depends on soil characteristics, cropping systems and size of farming operation. Further,
farmers' schooling enhances the efficiency of the adoption decision.
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Norris and Batie (1987) noted that attributes other than soil conserving properties of
soil conservation practices may affect adoption decisions. To examine this, their analysis
consisted of two tobit models, the first modelling soil conservation effort, measured as farm
expenditure on soil conservation (including maintenance and opportunity costs), and the
second modelling adoption of minimum tillage measured as total acres planted under
minimum tillage. These variables do not allow for analysis of the relative factors affecting
these decisions, reflected in the result that farm size and farm income were found to be the
most important explanatory variables.
Belknap and Saupe (1988) used maximum likelihood to estimate a probit model
relating variables to the probability that a farm operator used conservation tillage using
crossectional data from 529 randomly selected Wisconsin farmers. Farmers were defined as
having adopted conservation tillage if conservation tillage was used on part of the farm.
Independent variables were classified as being physical characteristics of the farm, farm
business characteristics and human resource characteristics. Unlike Rahm and Huffman
(1984), human capital variables were included in the adoption model to approximate
psychological costs of adoption, attitudes and management objectives. Farmers' risk
preferences were calculated from an index of their responses to questions on their attitudes
towards risk. Results indicate that more risk averse farmers and those less aware of the
damage of erosion on land values and crop productivity are less likely to adopt the use of no-
plow tillage; adoption is more likely on larger farms and is less likely on rented land, steeper
slopes and areas with cooler or wetter climates.
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The next study, Gould et al (1989), also analysed the adoption of conservation tillage
by 12240 farmers in southwest Wisconsin. Following Ervin and Ervin (1982) the adoption
decision was conceptualised as a process in which farmers only consider adoption if they are
aware of an erosion problem. The first stage of the analysis examined factors that influence
farmers' level of awareness of soil erosion as a problem facing the agricultural sector. This
was elicited by asking farmers whether they agreed with the statement, "Soil erosion is an
important problem in this area." Responses were captured as a dichotomous variable equal to
one if the respondent strongly agreed, otherwise zero. This was analysed in a probit model.
The estimates model had a correct classification of 65 percent and revealed that farmers who
have smaller farms, steeper soils, greater education, more experience, farm training, contact
with soil conservation service personnel, and those who plan to continue farming full are
likely to be more aware.
The second stage of the analysis used a model of conservation tillage adoption based
on a Tobit model, where the dependent variable was defined as the proportion of planted
acreage under conservation tillage and, thus, represented both adoption and extensiveness of
adoption of conservation tillage. Results show that adoption of conservation tillage is greater
on larger farms with dry and cold climates. Farm type also affected adoption according to
expectations. Younger farmers with greater income and education and who are aware of
erosion problems and spend less time in off farm employment and expect their farm to remain
in their family also adopt more minimum tillage.
Van Vuuren et al (1995) used logistic regression analysis to determine what impact
tenant, contract and land characteristics have on adoption of farm practices that enhance
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productivity and environmental husbandry on rented land. Six annual practices, including no-
till planting, strip cropping and contour farming (all soil conservation practices), and five
intermittent practices, including surface run-off control structures, were considered.
Estimated equations tended to have poor statistical fit of the data but revealed that contract
terms play an important role in promoting environmental husbandry on rented land. A
disappointing feature of this study is that interrelationships between adoption of the different
practices were not considered.
Most recently Traore et al (1998) studied the adoption of conservation practices
(conservation tillage and reduced chemical usage) by 82 Quebec potato farmers. They
conceptualised adoption to be a two-stage decision process: awareness of environmental
degradation is a precedent to adoption of conservation practices. Both awareness and
adoption are captured in dummy variables (hence extents of awareness and conservation
adoption are not captured) and analysed in models specified as logit models but referred to
throughout as probit models. Predicted environmental awareness was included as an
explanatory variable of adoption of conservation practices. The fit of the estimated models is
poor (McFadden's R2 statistics of 0.16 and 0.08 were achieved) but considered reasonable by
the authors. Results indicate that awareness of environmental problems is raised by the level
of education attainment, membership in producers' organisations, and participation in
government sponsored farm programmes. The adoption of conservation practices by farmers
was found to be positively influenced by the extent to which they [are predicted to] perceive
environmental degradation to be a problem, their education level, and the availability of
information on best management practices and negatively influenced by the expected crop
loss to pests and weeds, and the perceived health threat of farm chemicals. It was concluded
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that policies promoting awareness of environmental degradation are important for
encouraging adoption of conservation practices on potato farms.
Soil Conservation Adoption Studies
Ervin and Ervin (1982) was the first study to describe soil conservation decisions as a
multi-stage process. They analysed data from a sample of 92 farmers in Missouri. Soil
conservation was conceptualised as being determined by the following three stages:
recognition of the erosion problem; the number of conservation practices adopted; and
conservation effort reflecting effectiveness and extensiveness of practices adopted. This
study was also the first behavioural study to consider risk preferences as determinants of soil
conservation decisions. The survey incorporated a certainty equivalent approach to eliciting
farmers' risk preferences, however, enumerator error caused the results to be questionable. A
risk aversion index, constructed from responses to questions about the farmers' strength of
preference for avoiding a risky situation, was used instead.
Conservation adoption was defined as the number of soil conservation technologies
adopted on the farm (NPRAC). The authors noted that measurement of soil conservation
effort presented measurement problems. The authors suggested use of total capital
expenditure on soil conservation, however, the required data were not collected. The
approach used defines effort as the reduction in soil erosion rates attributable to adoption of
soil conservation practices. A problem with this definition is that a reduction of erosion by
say two tonnes/ha on less erosive land may require more effort than reduction of erosion by
four tonnes/ha on highly erosive land (Lockertz, 1991).
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Multiple regression analysis was used to test hypothesised relationships. Statistical fit
of the estimated equations to the data is poor with R2 statistics all lower than or equal to 0.31.
Results showed that NPRAC is positively influenced by education and farmers' perception of
an erosion problem, and negatively related to farmer's age, degree of risk aversion and less
likely on cash grain farms. Correlation analysis suggested that relatively more risk averse
farmers are less likely to adopt long term conservation investments, but equally likely to
adopt annual soil conservation practices. Effort is positively related to farm erosion potential
(possibly reflecting definition of the dependant variable), farmer's education, perceptions of
an erosion problem, and subsidy and cost sharing arrangements. Risk aversion was
positively, but not significantly, related to effort.
The researchers concluded that soil conservation programmes should target
homogenous groups of farmers according to their specific conservation needs. For example,
while younger farmers need financial assistance, older farmers require technical advice and
education programmes to promote awareness of erosion problems.
The next study, Saliba and Bromley (1986), defined conservation effort in terms of the
universal soil loss equation. C is the ratio of soil loss from a slope under specific annual
practices (eg, crop rotation, method of tillage) to that of an identical slope clean tilled
continuous fallow, providing a measure of soil conservation effort attributable to annual
management practices. P is a similar ratio that provides a measure of soil conservation
attributable to long term conservation investments (eg. contouring, terracing and
stripcropping). PxC provides a measure of soil conservation effort defined as the
proportionate reduction in soil loss attributable to adoption of management practices.
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Multiple regression techniques were used to estimate conservation effort, using a logit
transformation of the dependent variables to ensure that predicted values will fall between 0
and 1. Results of the estimated equations show improvement relative to the effort equation of
Ervin and Ervin (1982), indicated by R2 statistics of 0.28, 0.33 and 0.58 for the C, P and CxP
models respectively. Farm type, location and land characteristics variables predominantly
accounted for the explained variation, although results show that income (debt) is positively
(negatively) related to adoption of long term (annual) conservation investments, and farmers'
beliefs about the effect of erosion on crop yields (land values) does (do not) affect their
decisions.
Following a review of the literature Lynne et al (1988) concluded that agents'
attitudes, values beliefs, and intentions are important determinants of their economic
decisions. Consequently, they consider the decision making process to be a cohesive
conceptual framework linking psychological process to economic decisions, ie. social
situational factors, attitudes and social norms influence behavioural intentions and
subsequently behaviour. This framework was used to analyse soil conservation decisions of
103 fanners in Florida, U.S. Like Ervin and Ervin (1982), the authors expressed desire to
measure conservation effort in terms of expenditure on soil conservation, but data were not
available. Consequently the number of practices adopted was used (similar to Ervin and
Ervin's measurement of conservation adoption.) The independent variables encompassed
both attitudes and beliefs regarding conservation, willingness to take responsibility for
erosion externalities, and the general belief of being capable; tenure variables; values about
profitability, the future and farming as a way of life; risk preferences (a qualitative variable
coded 1 , 2, 3, or 4); income; credit; and a soil erodibility index.
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A Tobit model was used for the analysis to recognise that this dependent variable
takes on discrete values and has a lower bound of zero. Results suggest that the model has
strong representation of behaviour in the sample, and indicate that conservation adoption is
positively related to landownership, positive attitudes towards conservation, willingness to
take responsibility for externalities, aversion to risk and soil erodibility; but negatively related
to a belief in ability, value of profits, and after tax net farm income. Lynne et al (1988)
conclude that consideration of psychology shows promise for the improvement of economic
models of conservation behaviour.
Sinden and King's (1990) analysis of soil conservation by farmers in New South
Wales, Australia, conceptualised a similar model of decision making to that of Saliba and
Bromley (1986): Farmers' perception of the erosion status of the land depends on exogenous
land characteristics and the farmer's personal characteristics; recognition of an erosion
problem worth solving rests on their perception of land conditions, economic factors and the
farmer's motivation to address the problem; and the decision to undertake conservation
measures (FIXIT) rests on the perception and recognition stages and also institutional factors.
FIXIT was defined as a binary variable equal to one if the farmer adopts soil conservation
measures, otherwise zero. Logistic regression techniques were used to analyse the
hypothesised model. Results show that economic constraints primarily prevent farmers from
addressing erosion problems.
Featherstone and Goodwin (1993) analysed adoption of long term conservation
improvements by 541 Kansas farmers. They conceptualised farmers' decisions as maximising
their net present value, subject to constraints. This model was empirically represented using a
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simultaneous equations Tobit model to explicitly recognise that many of the variables that
conceptually influence conservation investment, such as government payment receipts, net
farm income, debt, and total crop and non crop acreage, are jointly determined with
investment. Unlike Young and Shortel (1984) who defined investment in soil conservation
using a dichotomous variable, Featherstone and Goodwin used total expenditures on long
term conservation measures to provide a continuous approximation of adoption. However,
despite having reviewed both Norris and Batie (1987) and Gould et al (1989) (the latter study
comments on the advantage of relative analysis) investment expenditure was defined on a
farm and not per acre basis. Consequently results are similar to those of Norris and Batie
(1987) showing positive relationships between investment in soil conservation and farm size,
farm income, farm debt, total assets and corporate ownership. Results must, therefore, be
interpreted with caution.
The only recent economic analysis of South African farmers' soil conservation
decisions, Barlow (1995), conceptualised a multi-stage process of soil conservation decisions.
This process is commenced with awareness of the occurrence of erosion, followed by the
perception that the erosion problem is worth solving. Subsequent decisions to adopt are
analysed in terms of conservation adoption and conservation effort (similar to Ervin and
Ervin, 1982).
Farmers' perceptions of their technical and financial abilities to effectively implement
conservation measures were also analysed. Conservation adoption was defined as the ratio of
the number of different types of soil conservation practices used on the farm to the maximum
applicable for a particular farm enterprise mix, and was analysed using logistic regression
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techniques. Conservation effort was defined in terms of logarithmic transformation of
farmers' own assessment of the percentages of their land protected with soil conservation
practices and was analysed using linear regression techniques. This variable, perhaps,
represents conservation extensiveness rather than efficiency of whole farm soil conservation.
Results show that conservation adoption is positively related to the farmer's technical
abilities to implement soil conservation measures, farmers' willingness to invest his own
capital in conservation, awareness of erosion's adverse impacts for productivity and visible
erosion impacts. Conservation effort is primarily dependent on financial factors.
3.1.2 Economic Models of Soil Conservation Decisions
Burt (1981) applied control theory to study the economics of soil conservation in the
Palouse area. He used a dynamic programming model to maximise the net present value of
net returns over an infinite planning horizon. His results indicate that, firstly, high product
prices exacerbate soil erosion problems and, secondly, that intensive wheat farming is the
optimal choice in both the intermediate and long run despite greater soil loss from this option.
This latter result is attributed to the extremely deep soil mantle of the Palouse region, thus the
conclusion cannot be extrapolated to other areas, especially those with shallow soils. This
study is important because it illustrates potential differences in optimal soil conservation
decisions from farm level and social perspectives because some costs of soil loss are external
to the farm.
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Kramer et al (1983) recognised that a profit maximising objective does not necessarily
represent farmers' decision objectives. Consequently they used a systematic quadratic risk
programming model that included simultaneous consideration of uncertainty in both revenues
and input supplies to study the influence of risk on farm level soil conservation decisions in
southeast Virginia. The model maximised expected utility as a function of net returns less a
risk premium.
Risk was incorporated using the variance-covariance matrices of returns based on
average product prices paid to farmers over a thirty-one year period (1949-79) and adjusted
for variance created by technological change. A variance-covariance matrix of available field
hours for the same time period was included to approximate uncertainty in input supplies.
Although not explicitly stated, the derivation of expected utility from a negative exponential
utility function into a function of expected returns and variance of returns implies that the risk
aversion coefficients used are the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient. Values used
ranged from 0.0 (risk neutrality) to a level of risk aversion of 0.002, however justification for
this range of values is not provided.
Results indicate that risk aversion influences optimal production decisions, with
implications for soil loss: forced reductions in soil loss generated substantial cuts in income
that are directly related to the level of risk aversion; and the degree of risk aversion was found
to influence the means by which erosion reductions were achieved. They concluded that
uncertainty warrants further attention in future erosion control studies.
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McSweeny and Kramer (1986) extended Kramer et al's study to incorporate a
government programme of cross compliance within the risk framework. The risk-reducing
potential of government price and income support programs, as well as crop insurance, were
explicitly recognised. Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficients used were selected
from a range of-0.0001 to 0.001 prescribed by King and Robison (but not adjusted for the
range of the data). Notable differences were found across both different policies and different
levels of risk aversion. Results suggest that cross-compliance might prove useful in inducing
risk averse producers to adopt soil and nutrient loss control programmes. Important aspects
of this study are the inclusion of options of endogenous risk reduction and that an effort was
made to incorporate appropriate representation of farmers' risk preferences. A weakness of
the last two studies is failure to consider on-farm costs of soil loss.
The next body of work, Klemme (1985), used stochastic dominance criteria to rank
methods of tillage (conventional, minimum, till-plant and no-till technologies) in corn and
soybean production under assumptions of risk. Cumulative probability distributions of net
returns to each technology were calculated using the Indiana experiment plot yield data. An
initial data analysis revealed that average net returns to land were lower for no-till relative to
the other three systems, however, standard deviations were also lower. Results indicate that
first-degree stochastic dominance does not exist in either corn or soybean production with
respect to method of tillage when soil loss is ignored, with the exception of conventional
tillage over no-till in rotation. Risk averse farmers who place low values on soil loss may
select tillage intensive systems since they are generally stochastically dominant over no-till in
the production of wheat and soybeans. Stochastic dominance rankings were affected towards
favouring reduced tillage practices through the introduction of on farm costs of soil loss.
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An expected value-variance framework was used by Tew et al (1986) to assess the
risk efficiency of alternative tillage practices for irrigated corn production using data from an
experimental site in Colorado. Three tillage systems were considered: conventional tillage,
conservation tillage and minimum tillage. Two levels of herbicide application were applied
to each tillage system, and irrigation was applied using high and low pressure delivery
systems providing 12 production systems in total. The efficient set theorem, an extension of
expected utility theory, was used to provide a criterion for choosing risk efficient alternatives
from those considered in the analysis. Only those systems that included conservation or
conventional tillage practices proved risk efficient. A criticism of this study is that it failed to
consider the on-farm costs of soil loss.
Finally, Setia and Johnson (1988) used expected utility maximisation and safety-first
decision criteria to analyse the effect of uncertainty on soil conservation systems for corn and
soybeans in Illinois. Stochastic elements of the model represent variability in net returns
from price and yield fluctuations. The models were estimated over a range of risk
preferences, represented by confidence levels that a goal will be achieved. Hence a
confidence interval of 50% (99%) implies risk neutrality (extreme risk aversion). Results
were obtained using two discount rates, viz: 4% and 8%, and three planning periods (1, 10,
and 25 years) to incorporate the dynamic nature of soil conservation. On farm costs of soil
loss are included by considering costs to be a function of topsoil depth. Results indicate that
soil conservation decisions should be affected by risk and fanners' risk preferences.
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3.1.3 Discussion
Despite considerable empirical research and attention directed to the issues of
technological adoption, a consensus has not yet developed regarding the social and economic
conditions that lead farmers to conserve soil. Empirical results do show some consistency in
that education, financial constraints and land characteristics seem to be important
determinants of soil conservation decisions, however, statistical fit of the estimated models
tend to be relatively poor, reflecting that agricultural economists have a poor understanding of
factors affecting farmers' soil conservation decisions.
Whereas earlier behavioural studies defined technology adoption using dichotomous
variables, more recent studies tend to define the dependent variable to reflect the
extensiveness of adoption on farms for both annual practices and conservation investments.
Consequently models of soil conservation have become statistically more demanding,
advancing from bivariate probability models to Tobit models, which are better suited to
relative analysis of adoption decisions. At this stage it seems important to note that,
McCullagh and Nelder (1983), Madalla (1992: 345), and Gujarati (1995: 572), amongst
others, present valid arguments against the use of Tobit analyses in studies where the
dependent variable is not censored, clearly the case in the forementioned studies. These
arguments are expounded upon in the discussion on appropriate methodology for the current
study in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Suffice to say that according to these statisticians and
econometricians, the results of the afore-mentioned studies may be biased.
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Remarkable variation in measurement of farmer's soil conservation effectiveness is
also evident. Aggregate adoption of soil conservation practices is commonly used, but
provides no information on effectiveness and extensiveness of adoption. Effectiveness of soil
conservation is represented in measures of soil conservation effort based on reductions in soil
loss attributable to management practices (eg. Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Saliba and Bromley,
1988). Barlow (1995) captured extensiveness of adoption, but not effectiveness, in his
measure of soil conservation effort. Expenditure on soil conservation (eg. Featherstone and
Goodwin, 1993) reflects farmers' effort but not necessarily effectiveness of achieved soil
conservation. Developing an objective measurement of soil conservation efficiency that
measures both effectiveness and extensiveness of adoption, and allows for relative analysis is
an important goal for economic research in soil conservation.
Although soil conservation practices are theoretically substitutes in erosion control, no
studies have analysed interrelationships between the adoption of different soil conservation
practices, nor intra-farm variations in soil conservation decisions and achieved soil
conservation efficiency. Identification of a process of achieving farm soil conservation, say a
sequential order to adoption of technologies, or other interaction between soil conservation
decisions may advance empirical analysis of soil conservation decisions. Intra-farm
variations in soil conservation adoption have been observed in previous studies (hence the
objective to reflect extensiveness of adoption). Hence, it is also likely that there are intra-
farm variations in achieved soil conservation effectiveness. Understanding why any trends in
intra-farm soil conservation exist is important to understanding soil conservation decisions.
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Economists investigating consumer demand have accumulated considerable evidence
showing that consumers generally have subjective preferences for characteristics of products
and that the demand for products is significantly affected by their perceptions of the products'
attributes (Adesina et al, 1995). A noticeable trend in the soil conservation studies reviewed
is increased consideration of psychological variables (eg, perceptions, awareness, attitudes
and concerns) as determinants of soil conservation decisions. Farmer's psychology is clearly
important in explaining conservation decisions, primarily due to the indiscernible nature of
much soil erosion and the subjective nature of costs and benefits of soil loss and soil
conservation respectively. Although these studies, in particular Lynne et al (1988),
demonstrate that these variables improve statistical fit of the estimated models, this author
cautions that they should not be included in economic studies at the expense of policy related
variables. From a policy perspective, agricultural economists should seek to identify policy
related variables which affect a shift in the demand for soil conservation or influence
constraints to adoption.
Finally, economic criteria used to incorporate risk and risk preferences in economic
models of decision making include stochastic efficiency, utility maximisation, expected
value-variance analysis and safety-first criteria. Chronological analysis reveals a progression
over time to provide a more holistic representation of the farmers' decision-making
environments through incorporating sources of risk and endogenous risk reducing strategies.
Although results suggest that farmers' risk preferences should be important determinants of
their soil conservation decisions, the source(s) of risk considered and the algorithms used in
mathematical programming studies essentially predetermine the relationship between farmers'
risk preferences and their decisions.
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Positive economic verification that risk and risk preferences influence soil
conservation is rare. Those studies that have considered risk preferences have used crude
indices of farmers' attitudes towards risk in lieu of economic measures of risk preferences,
such as AP's. This may reflect high costs of eliciting farmers' risk preferences. More
precisely elicited measures of risk preference are important to identify the role of uncertainty
and risk preferences in soil conservation decisions. The following section reviews research
that provides insight on approaches for eliciting and analysing risk preferences.
3.2 A Review of Studies Eliciting and Analysing Risk Preferences
Several analytical methods have been developed to express the underlying utility
function and estimate the risk preference of the decision maker, including (a) direct elicitation
of utility (DEU), (b) experimental methods (EM), and (c) econometric methods (ECM). DEU
is commonly used. Utility functions are derived through interview procedures designed to
determine points of indifference between certain outcomes and risky options. This requires
the premise that decision makers can judge the point of indifference, or certainty equivalent,
of a risky prospect in a hypothetical gambling situation. The experimental method is similar
but provides financial compensation as a function of the responses made by decision makers
in the elicitation survey. These studies have generally been carried out in populations with
low per capita income and wealth eg. Binswanger (1980) in India, Kachelmeier and Shehata
(1992) in China, and Grisley and Kellog (1987) in Thailand.
Direct elicitation of utility and experimental approaches differ in methodology
essentially in only one respect: for DEU used hypothetical risk situations are used to
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determine risk preferences while EM creates real risk situations by providing financial
rewards for responses. DEU and EM approaches may be subdivided into: (a) direct
elicitation of single valued utility functions through eliciting certainty equivalents, (b) lottery
choice tasks, and (c) the interval method.
Certainty equivalent tasks involve four components: the sure amount, an outcome
denoted gain, an outcome denoted loss, and a probability level. The process usually involves
providing the subject with three of the four components and finding a level of the fourth
where the respondent is indifferent between the gamble and the sure amount (Cochran et al,
1990). Lottery choice tasks are similar. The process involves providing respondents with a
choice of several lotteries for which all four components are provided. Risk preferences are
inferred through the decision makers' choice of lottery.
The Interval Approach to eliciting risk preferences was developed by King and
Robison (1981) and is founded primarily on stochastic dominance with respect to a function.
The approach entails choice of appropriate risk preference levels (thus creating risk
preference intervals) and risk situations. Risk situations are defined by distributions of
income, say a reference income level of R50 000 with a standard deviation of 10 percent.
Computer packages are used to elicit subsets of this distribution, each of which is
stochastically dominant for one of the chosen risk preference levels. Respondents are
required to choose between pairs of these income distributions to determine in which risk
preference interval their risk preferences lie. By constructing interval measurements on the
basis of information available at the end of each question, a decision maker can, in theory, be
channelled into an ever narrowing risk-aversion interval through the selection of successive
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income distributions. Econometric methods infer risk attitudes by comparing actual
economic behaviour with behaviour predicted by some empirically specified model such as
profit maximisation. It is assumed that model specification is correct, consequently the
residual is assigned completely to risk preferences.
This discussion focuses on empirical findings regarding the distribution of risk
preferences within populations, conclusions regarding the structure of risk preferences in
study populations, and how socioeconomic characteristics affect risk preferences. First,
however, the impact of adjusting (not adjusting) AP's for the range of the data for each of
these approaches is discussed in section 3.2.1. This is necessary for discussion of empirical
results in these studies. Subsequently studies using DEU and EM approaches to eliciting risk
preferences are reviewed in section 3.2.2 and econometric approaches are reviewed in section
3.2.3.
3.2.1 Impacts of Adjusting AP's for the Range of the Data
Intra-study comparisons of risk preferences elicited for lotteries of different range are
common and are used to infer the structure of risk preferences within a population. This
section considers the consequences of not adjusting AP's for the range of the data on
interpretation of results. Two methodologies are discussed: certainty equivalent tasks (for
which AP is calculated following elicitation of a response to a risk situation) and the interval
approach (where a response is assigned to pre-determined risk preference interval).
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Firstly, consider the implications of AP being sensitive to the range of the data for a
certainty equivalent task where the range of each lottery is proportionate to its expected value,
eg. Dillon and Scandizzo (1978) and Bond and Wonder (1980). As lottery range (the
magnitude of risk) increases theory predicts that risk preferences will become more averse,
however increases in wealth attributable to the lottery games will induce less risk averse
behaviour (Pratt, 1964). The amendment to Raskin and Cochran's first theorem shows that if
E[x,] < E[x2] (ie. oxl < oX2) and if absolute risk aversion is held constant then r(x,) > r(x2). In
other words, failure to adjust AP's for the range of the data will bias findings towards
decreasing absolute risk aversion as risk increases. This phenomenon may be incorrectly
ascribed to reflecting Pratt's (1964) hypothesis that risk aversion decreases with wealth by
less informed researchers.
The sensitivity of AP's to the range of the data also has important implications for the
interval approach. Denote two reference income levels X, and X2 for which corresponding
sets of income distributions di; and d2i are defined by mean incomes xlf and x2j and standard
deviations of su and s2i respectively. Since r(xh) = (s2j/s,j)r(x2i) if r(x,j) = r(x2j) then sn = s2i.
Failure to adjust AP bounds on the risk intervals for the range of risk required for each
income reference level suggests that corresponding income distributions across the different
reference income levels will be risk preserving. Consequently, analysis of how elicited risk
preferences change as income reference level increases captures only wealth affects from
(often hypothetical) changes in wealth, unless the range of the data is adjusted appropriately
for AP's.
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3.2.2 Direct Elicitation of Utility and Experimental Approaches
Only three studies of farmers' risk preferences have been previously completed in
South Africa, those by Lombard and Kassier (1991), Meering and Oosthuizen (1993), and
Botes et al (1994). All these studies used DEU approaches. Consequently, the current
research relies predominantly on international research.
Foreign Research
The first study in this section, Dillon and Scandizzo (1978), studied risk preferences
of a sample of 103 subsistence farmers in northeast Brazil using a certainty equivalent task.
An interesting feature of this study is that they used simulated but realistic farming problems
rather than pure simulated gambles to elicit risk preferences. Gamble ranges varied according
to whether the farmer was an owner (larger range) or a sharecropper and whether the gamble
ensured subsistence or not. Risk preferences were measured using AP's (not adjusted for
range), calculated under the assumption of negative exponential utility. Results indicated that
most fanners are risk averse, increasingly so when subsistence was at risk, although a wide
spectrum of risk preferences within the population was evident. The finding that owners tend
to be more risk averse that sharecroppers may reflect that AP's were not adjusted for the range
of the data. Gamble characteristics and socioeconomic variables were regressed upon the
elicited risk premiums. Results indicate that gamble characteristics, level of income and
perhaps other socioeconomic characteristics influence peasants attitudes towards risks.
69
Binswanger (1980) measured attitudes towards risk in 240 peasant households in
India for both real and hypothetical gambles using a lottery choice task. This approach was
preferred to that of Dillon and Scandizzo (1978) due to concern over respondent literacy (he
desired a more simple experiment) and because he was concerned that the latter approach
may lead to interviewer bias. Gambles were limited so that the lowest possible outcome was
zero gain to confront moral problems involved in gambling and the experiment was designed
to allow for long periods of reflection and opportunities for consultation; fixed neutral
probabilities (ie P{win} = P{loss} = 0.5) using the toss of an unbiased coin were used to
overcome probability preferences. Payoffs at their maximum exceeded monthly incomes of
unskilled labourers, thus risks posed were significant. Risk preferences were measured as the
partial risk aversion coefficient, calculated using a constant partial risk aversion utility
function.
Results indicate that virtually all individuals are moderately risk averse with little
variation according to personal characteristics, although wealth has a slight negative effect on
risk aversion especially at low payoff levels. Distributions of risk preferences were more
widely spread at low levels and for hypothetical gambles, suggesting that high payoffs and a
games approach are more likely to elicit true risk preferences. Results support the hypothesis
of increasing partial risk aversion with increasing payoff level.
Whereas the previous two studies elicited risk preferences from low wealth
populations, an interesting feature of the study by Bond and Wonder (1980) is that they
studied risk preferences of Australian farmers, a relatively high income population. They
used a similar approach to Dillon and Scandizo (1978) to elicit risk preferences of 201
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commercial Australian farmers. Results indicate that although aversion is the most prevalent
risk attitude, there exists a wide distribution of risk preferences ranging from preference to
aversion. No firm relationships were found between elicited risk aversion coefficients and
socioeconomic variables.
Wilson and Eidman (1983) elicited and analysed risk preferences of forty five
Minnesota swine farmers using the interval approach. The Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion
coefficient was used to measure risk preferences, and was calculated assuming a negative
exponential utility function. Two pilot studies of eleven students and twenty farmers
respectively were conducted to determine appropriate risk preference intervals and reference
income levels. Eight risk preference intervals were used with specific boundaries ranging
from -0.0002 to 0.0003, and after tax net income of $16500, $31000 and $55000 were used as
reference income levels.
Results indicated that 22 percent of farmers were risk preferring, 34 percent were risk
neutral and 44 percent were risk averse. Increasing, constant, decreasing and mixed absolute
risk aversion with increasing income reference level were all prevalent amongst the
respondents, although decreasing absolute risk aversion was most prevalent, particularly in
the lowest income group. Consistency checks indicated that approximately 25% of
respondents demonstrated intransitivity. These results suggest that there is a trade off
between the degree of accuracy demanded in the procedure and the transitive nature of the
respondents. A discriminant analysis on three categories of risk preferences (risk preferring,
risk neutral and risk averse) indicated that risk aversion is positively related to wealth
(contradicting the finding that DARA (decreasing absolute risk aversion) and CARA
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(constant absolute risk aversion) are the most common risk preference structures), and
diversification but negatively related to net income, age, education, debt and size of farming
operation. However, the estimated discriminant function classified only 51 percent of cases
correctly. This may indicate a problem in the elicitation procedure or that other variables also
influence risk preferences. They concluded that personal interviews to explain the
questioning process may improve the accuracy of the elicitation procedure.
Tauer (1986) used the interval approach to measuring risk preferences of 72 New
York dairy farmers. Methodology used was similar to that of Wilson and Eidmann (1983).
Eight risk preference intervals were selected, based on the work of King and Robison and
preliminary testing, with specific boundaries ranging from -0.001 to 0.001 and two reference
income measures of $15000 and $30000. There was replication at each of the two income
levels to allow analysis of consistency of elicited risk preferences. Of the 151 respondents 79
failed consistency tests and were excluded from the analysis, suggesting that respondents
have difficulty in distinguishing levels of risk from income distributions.
Results indicate that 26 percent of farmers were risk preferring, 39 percent risk neutral
and 34 percent risk averse, and indicated evidence of decreasing absolute risk aversion,
interpreted by the author that risk aversion decreases as wealth increases. Tauer (pp. 11) does
caution that risk preference may be elicited because " In a survey it is very easy to choose the
distribution with the largest single outcome", thus, "one may be sceptical that farmers would
display this behaviour if the stakes were real". The Wilcoxon test was used to test for
increasing or decreasing risk aversion with reference income level.
Logistic and linear probability models used to examine socioeconomic attributes on
risk preferences, but explanatory power of the estimated models was low. Results indicated
that risk aversion decreases with age and increases with education and wealth (contradicting
the interpretation of DARA).
It is interesting to note that both of the above studies found that risk aversion increases
with wealth and that DARA and CARA are most prevalent, suggesting that change in risk
preferences across reference income levels is not a wealth effect. Section 3.2.1 showed that
changes cannot be ascribed to changes in the size of the risk situation either since
corresponding income distributions across reference income levels are risk preserving. This
suggests that higher income levels tend to encourage less risk averse behaviour, possibly
because the coefficient of variation for the distributions decrease as reference income
increases. This may also be related to the hypothetical nature of the questions.
A similar study was conducted by Thomas (1987) for 30 Kansas farmers. Reference
income levels used where $50000, $25000, $0, -$25000 and -$50000. Eight risk aversion
intervals were specified with specific boundaries of-0.0005, -0.0001, 0.0000, 0.0001, 0.0003,
0.0006,0.0010 and 0.0050. Results indicate that the majority of farmers are risk averse, that
absolute risk aversion is fairly constant across the reference income levels and that risk
preferences are not significantly related to age. Elicited risk preferences were used to
investigate the accuracy of fanners' own assessments of their risk attitudes. Farmers were
asked to rate themselves on a scale of 1 to 8, where one is extreme aversion and 8 is extreme
preference. Farmers were then categorised into two groups according to their ranking (1 to 4
and 5 to 8) representing those who consider themselves to be risk averse or risk loving
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respectively. Group means were calculated for the groups and compared. Results showed
that the group of farmers who classified themselves as being risk averse were significantly
more risk averse than the group who classified themselves as being risk loving. From this it
was concluded that "some farmers apparently were capable of assessing their own risk
attitudes" and that this should be further explored in future research.
Grisley and Kellog (1987) is another application of the experimental lottery choice
approach used by Binswanger (1980). Risk preferences of 39 small semi-commercial farmers
from two villages in Northern Thailand were elicited. A total of five sets of games, each with
eleven choices of lotteries, with increasing real monetary payoffs were played over a period of
five weeks. A further four games with hypothetical payoffs was also played to determine if
revealed risk preferences are affected by the offer of real payoffs. Three of these games used
lottery choices from games with real payoffs. In addition to measuring risk preferences in
terms of the partial relative risk aversion coefficient the proportional insurance premium,
defined as the difference between a risk neutral lottery and the lottery in question divided by
the risk neutral lottery, was also used.
All the farmers surveyed were found to be risk averse and their preferences, on
average, conformed to the hypothesis of increasing partial risk aversion. Farmers' risk
preferences converged toward homogeneity as the magnitude of the monetary payoffs
increased. Significant positive correlations were found between elicited risk preferences for
corresponding real and hypothetical lotteries, suggesting that risk preferences can be elicited
using hypothetical gambles. Aversion to risks was found to be negatively related to yield
risk, indicating that less risk averse farmers are more prepared to take on more risky
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investments, and farm size, and positively related to wealth; enterprise diversification,
indicating that more risk averse farmers engage in cropping diversification; and the farmer's
mathematical ability, which suggests that farmers with better mathematical skills were more
able to gauge risk. Stronger results in explaining risk preferences relative to previous studies
must, however, be interpreted with care due to the small sample size.
Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) used a certainty equivalent task to elicit individual
risk preferences over a series of dichotomous lotteries with varying probabilities to win a
monetary prize. The objectives of this study were twofold: a) to examine whether the level of
monetary incentives influences the pattern of revealed risk preferences. Secondly, to examine
the effect of the probability of winning on risk preferences. This study used certainty
equivalent approach instead of a lottery choice task following a review by Treversky which
concluded that lottery choices do not necessarily correspond to the preferences inferred from
a lottery pricing task. It also allowed direct evaluation of the influence of probabilities on risk
preferences. Each sequence of trials consisted of 25 lotteries using win percentages varying
from 5 to 95 percent, in no discernable order. The measure of risk preference used is the ratio
of a subject's certainty equivalent for that lottery to the lotteries expected value. Results
indicate that respondents revealed increasing relative risk aversion with increasing real
monetary prizes. There was also a pronounced sensitivity to different win percentages.
Finally, they found that the effect of monetary prizes are real, albeit subtle.
Gunjal and Legault (1995) favoured a direct method of elicitation of risk preferences
of Quebec farmers following observed inconsistencies of choices at various income levels
under the interval approach in the literature. A lottery pricing task with hypothetical, but
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realistic farm alternatives was used for three income levels: $50,000; $100,000 and $150,000.
An interesting feature of this study is that three point distributions were specified for the
lotteries, ie. high, average and low returns. The assumption of symmetry within each
distribution was made for simplicity. Following Binswanger (1980), a constant partial risk
aversion utility function was assumed. The Delphi technique was used in elicitation of risk
preferences. This is an interactive process usually involving several rounds with feedback of
important group results after each round to obtain refined responses. Their justification of
this technique was that in the real world, the decision maker often uses external information
to see how his/her judgement concurs with others, thus the Delphi technique may generate
more realistic results. In this study only two rounds were used. The sample consisted of 100
dairy and hog farmers in Quebec. Farmers were surveyed by personal interview on their
farms.
Results indicate that in the second round risk aversion increased in the dairy sector but
decreased in the hog sector. However, the differences between rounds were statistically non-
significant at the ten percent level of probability and thus do not conclusively suggest that the
Delphi technique resulted in any relative consensus for a particular investment decision by
both dairy and hog producers. The results also indicate that there is a wide distribution of risk
preferences among the survey population. The percentage of risk preferring farmers ranged
from 8% to 23% depending on the level of investment. On average, however, both groups
tend to be risk averse, with hog producers on average more risk averse than dairy farmers
which may reflect the greater income stability of dairy farmers. Increasing partial risk
aversion with investment size was evident for both sectors.
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South African Research
Lombard and Kassier (1990) was the first economic study of South African farmers'
risk preferences. They used the interval approach to elicit the risk attitudes of 52 farmers in
the Western and Southern Cape using a similar methodology to Tauer (1986) and Wilson and
Eidman (1983). Risk attitudes were measured, using the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion
coefficient, on a sixteen point scale ranging from -0.001 to 0.01 for each of five reference
income levels, defined as after tax annual income levels of-R5000, R15000, R35000,
R70000, and Rl 10000. Results of the research indicate that risk preference, neutrality and
aversion are all present in the sample population. Risk preferences, however, varied amongst
different income levels for many respondents, suggesting some inconsistencies in elicited risk
preferences. Like Tauer (1986) they concluded that there appears to be a tradeoff between
accuracy of the risk interval and the consistency of choice.
Meering and Oosthuizen (1993) elicited risk preferences of irrigation farmers in the
lower area of the P.K. le Roux dam of South Africa using an interval approach. An objective
of this research was to examine the impact of increased risk on elicited AP's. Thirty-four
farmers were inconsistent in their risk preferences and were omitted from the second survey.
Questionnaires were compiled with distribution values around the levels of 0, R30 000, R60
000, R90 000, R120 000, Rl 50 000 and Rl 80 000. The variation of the distributions was
taken to be 10% and 50% of the level concerned.
Results indicated increasing consistency in risk preferences at higher income levels
which was attributed to clearer differences among distributions at higher levels. The number
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of risk averse farmers increased as risk increased. Most respondents were either strongly risk
seeking or strongly risk averse, a deviation from previous research. This was attributed to the
absolute risk aversion scale that was used, the bigger variations in distributions, and the
research population. Results suggest that farmers may have difficulties in assessing the
relative riskiness of different income distributions.
The most recent South African study, Botes et al (1994), elicited risk preferences of
52 irrigation farmers in the Winterton are of KwaZulu-Natal. An interesting objective of this
study was to determine whether attitudes towards wealth risk are significantly different
towards annual income risk. A similar methodology to that of Meering and Oosthuizen
(1993) was used to elicit risk preferences. Risk intervals were selected based on Tauer's
(1986) study, correctly adjusted for the scale of currencies using Raskin and Cochran's (1986)
first theorem and an exchange rate of 1$ = R3. A rescaling factor of 10 was used to rescale
the annual income measurement scale for wealth, justified by the same theorem. This
produced risk intervals in the range of-0.00030 to 0.00170 (-0.00003 to 0.00017) for income
(wealth). Income and wealth levels of R0, R60 000 and R120 000, and R250 000, R600 000
and R950 000 respectively were used as appropriate reference income and wealth measures.
Income distributions were calculated allowing for variation specified by standard
deviations of 15% of the reference income level, which reflect variations in income and
wealth levels experienced by farmers in survey population. Twenty distributions with six
values each were generated for each of the income/wealth levels. Following Tauer (1986) the
Wilcoxon test was used to test consistency of elicited risk preferences. Thirty of the farmers
were found to be consistent in their risk preferences. The other farmers were excluded from
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the analysis. Results indicate that, firstly, most farmers are risk neutral, although some
revealed extreme risk preferences; secondly, fanners are significantly more averse towards
wealth than income risks; and thirdly, although there is some evidence of decreasing absolute
risk aversion, no evidence could be found that risk aversion continually changed as the level
of income/wealth changed from high to low levels. Thus the null hypothesis of constant
absolute risk aversion was accepted.
This study is important because adjustment of AP's for the comparison of income and
wealth risk preferences is essentially the first attempt in the literature to adjust AP's for the
range of the data. However, the amendment to Raskin and Cochran's (1986) first theorem
developed in the previous chapter indicates that the scaling factor, c, should be the ratio of
risk between two gambles. Botes et al (1994) calculated the rescaling factor as the ratio of
corresponding average wealth levels used to average income levels used (which equals 10).
Ratios of the standard deviations for each corresponding set of wealth and income levels are
12, 10 and 12.9, suggesting that c should be approximately equal to 11.5. If c < s2/s,, then
r(X|) < r(x2), where sl and s2 are the standard deviations of the income reference levels. Use
of an incorrect rescaling factor thus places an upward bias on risk in the wealth risk aversion
distributions relative to the income risk aversion distributions. The observed increase in risk
aversion is, at least partially, due to increased risk, and not necessarily due to the nature of the
risk. Consequently, the result that farmers are more averse to wealth risk relative to income
risk must be interpreted with caution.
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3.2.3 Econometric Approaches
Moscardi and de Janvry (1977) derived attitudes towards risk amongst peasants in
Puebla, Mexico from survey data in a model of safety-first behaviour. Quantities of nitrogen
fertiliser per hectare were expected to indicate risk aversion since it is agronomically the most
important input for increasing yields in the area and is also the largest component of variable
cost. The marginal productivity of nitrogen was estimated for each household from an
estimated production function, and together with the coefficient of variation in yield, factor
prices and product prices was used to calculate a measure of risk aversion, K. Results
indicated that the distribution of K is biased towards risk aversion. Socioeconomic
characteristics of the peasant households were regressed on K to explain differences in risk
preferences. Results indicate that households that control more land and who have better
access to credit and services are less averse to risk. Family size and education and age of the
household head were not statistically significant in explaining risk aversion. Criticisms of
this study are that constraints to use of nitrogen fertiliser, such as access to credit, will be
reflected in K, although the affect on actual risk preferences may be different. Further, K
provides no information regarding the magnitude of risk preferences.
Antel (1987) used a moments based approximation of the revenue function to
econometrically estimate the distribution of attitudes towards risk for a population of farmers
in India. The moments of revenue were specified as quadratic functions of preharvest human
labour, animal labour, fertiliser and land. Fertiliser and labour were considered for elicitation
of risk preferences, however, fertilizer use was found to be constrained by credit availability.
The parameters of the distribution of risk attitudes were estimated using an instrumental
80
variable approach developed in the same paper. The instruments were specified as variety,
seasonal and annual dummy variables, output price, farmer's education, and rainfall variables.
These variables are assumed to be exogenous to risk attitudes, but correlated with labour
choices, and are thus appropriate instruments.
Both the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient and downside risk aversion
coefficient, DS, were estimated, where DS = U'"(x)/U'(x). Results indicate that the
population is characterised by both Arrow-Pratt risk aversion (mean estimated AP coefficient
of 3.272) and downside risk aversion (mean estimated DS coefficient of 4.254) with
considerable heterogeneity of both. By expressing risk aversion as the partial risk aversion
coefficient, it was shown that results are comparable to those of Binswanger (1980) for a
similar population. This study demonstrates that production survey data and econometric
models can be used to estimate the distribution of risk attitudes in a producer population,
however, results will only be reliable to the extent that both technology and behavioural
models are well approximated. Despite the advances made by this study, the structure of risk
aversion is imposed by the choice of utility function and that separation of production
technology from risk preference estimation may introduce both inconsistency and
inefficiency.
More recently, Saha et al (1994) developed a method to permit joint estimation of risk
preference structure, degree of risk aversion, and production technology. The method is
implemented by using the expo-power utility function, which imposes no restrictions on risk
preferences structure and thus allows estimation of both the degree and nature of risk
aversion. Estimation relies on the first order conditions of expected utility maximisation
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under output uncertainty. Empirical estimation of this method used farm level data from 15
Kansas wheat farmers over four years. Findings show that Kansas farmers are risk averse and
their risk preferences are characterised by decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing
relative risk aversion with increasing wealth. Results further indicated that combined
estimation of production function parameters with utility function parameters is more
efficient than is the separate estimation of each.
Finally, Bar-Shira et al (1997) derived an econometric procedure for estimating
Arrow-Pratt coefficients of risk aversion, including the absolute, relative and partial risk
aversion coefficients, and the elasticity of absolute risk aversion with respect to wealth.
Farmers from cooperative settlement (moshav) of farmers in the Arava region of Israel were
studied. Each farm on the moshav is privately controlled, however marketing and input
purchasing are done cooperatively. Strict rules of entry leads to a homogenous population in
terms of preferences, hence it was considered reasonable to consider differences in wealth as
the primary factor affecting risk preferences. The econometric model describes farmers'
choices: because all labour is supplied by the households, farmers must select a portfolio of
land allocations and leisure. By choosing different land allocations farmers are choosing
different lotteries. Consequently individuals choices of their crop allocations and leisure
consumption is indicative of their risk preferences. Expectations of future profit drives the
decision process. Variation in risk attitudes across individuals is accounted for in the model
by replacing a parameter in the model with a vector of socio-economic characteristics, such
that risk aversion may vary across individuals but the elasticity of absolute risk aversion is
kept constant. A two-stage instrumental approach was used to estimate the model.
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The elasticity of absolute risk aversion with respect to wealth was calculated to be
equal to -0.316. Consequently the hypotheses of decreasing absolute risk aversion and
increasing relative risk aversion were accepted. These findings empirically verify Arrow's
hypotheses. Results also indicated that farmers with higher levels of experience as well as
farmers with better managerial abilities exhibit a lower degree of risk aversion; both results
indicating that risk is a complicating factor which farmers with less experience or lower
managerial ability try to avoid. Education and diligence were associated with greater risk
aversion indicating that educated farmers better understand how to avoid risk and that harder
working farmers can reduce risk ex post, thus appearing risk averse ex ante.
A positive feature of these studies is that measures of risk aversion are compared
according to income, thus interpretation of decreasing absolute risk aversion with wealth is
accurate because AP's were compared over individuals of different wealth levels.
Developments in elicitation through ECM reveal a progression towards overcoming problems
of constraining the functional form of utility and developing more efficient estimators of risk
preferences. They also measure risk preferences based on actual decisions. Constraints of
varied technology within the study population have also been overcome by Saha et al (1994)
by specifying all inputs in production as capital. Disadvantages of this approach include that
these studies are information intensive and they assign all estimation error to risk preferences.
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3.2.4 Discussion
This section reviewed research that elicited farmers' risk preferences. It was shown
that although AP's are affected by both wealth and the size of the risk situation, most
researchers have interpreted considered changes in AP's across gambles exclusively as wealth
effects. Further, adjustment of AP's for the range of the data is necessary for correct
interpretation of these findings. No previous studies have appropriately adjusted AP's for the
range of the data. Consequently, the studies reviewed provide little insight to the structure of
absolute risk aversion in the study populations. Meering and Oosthuisen's (1993) results do,
however, suggest increasing absolute risk aversion as risk increases and several studies found
absolute risk aversion to be positively related to wealth - contrary to Pratt's hypothesis.
Elicitation procedures may be categorised as direct elicitation of risk preferences or
econometric methods. The latter category are relatively less common but have shown
considerable advancement over the past two decades. They remain data intensive and are
criticised for the residuals being assigned entirely to risk attitudes when there exists a variety
of other possible sources for such discrepancies. Risk preference are less costly to elicit using
DEU techniques. Experimental techniques have been used for elicitation of risk preferences
of peasant farmers, but budgetary constraints preclude their use for wealthy populations if
meaningful questions are to be asked. Chronological analysis shows an early use of certainty
equivalent tasks. Lottery choice systems became popular following Binswanger's study for
eliciting risk preferences in low income populations, whilst the interval approach became
common for eliciting risk preferences in high income populations. Results from all these
studies indicate that respondents have increasing difficulty in distinguishing the level of risk
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implied by income or wealth distributions as the absolute risk aversion intervals became
narrower. This implies a tradeoff between consistency and accuracy. Consequently, more
recent studies conducted overseas have reverted to use of certainty equivalent tasks.
Results of all previous studies suggest that populations contain a broad distribution of
risk preferences. Most respondents in low wealth populations have been classified as risk
averse; risk neutrality and preference are prevalent in more wealthy populations. However,
efforts to relate heterogeneity of risk preferences to socio-economic characteristics of
respondents have met with limited success. Kachelmeier and Shehata's (1992) good results in
explaining elicited risk preferences are entirely due to gamble, not respondent, characteristics.
Issues of previous empirical analyses must be jointly considered with knowledge of
the study population to facilitate specification of a research methodology that is both feasible
and appropriate. Consequently, the discussion presented in the following chapter describes
the study population and their decision making environment.
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4. THE STUDY POPULATION
The model of decision making conceptualised in the first chapter indicated that soil
conservation decisions are characterised by what they have in common and how they differ.
Common factors serve to define the set of possible soil conservation technology bundles and
describe the decision making environment of all farmers. Description of this decision-
making environment is necessary to evaluate the feasibility of implementing the conceptual
models for analysis of heterogeneity in farmers' soil conservation decisions.
This chapter serves to describe the environment in which South African sugarcane
farmers' soil conservation decisions are made. An overview of sugarcane production in South
Africa is provided, followed by a description of the set of feasible soil conservation practices.
Previous and current changes to this decision making environment attributable to South
African soil conservation policy and institutions are then described. Finally, the suitability
and feasibility of implementing the conceptual model using South African sugarcane farmers
as a study population is discussed.
4.1 Introduction
The population of sugarcane growers in South Africa may be categorised as small-
scale and developing farmers (mostly non-White) and large scale commercial (mostly White)
farmers. Millers have developed areas for small growers (Maher and Platford, 1994), thus
soil conservation on that land is only partially a function of the farmer's own decisions.
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In South Africa, sugarcane is grown on about 400 000 ha under a wide range of
climatic and soil conditions (Meyer et al, 1996). The sugarcane producing areas are situated
mostly in the catchment areas of gently to steeply undulating land in KwaZulu-Natal (Tudor-
Owen and Wyatt, 1991). Sugarcane may be rainfed or grown under irrigation. Rainfall
varies widely in amount, intensity, and distribution, and drought and floods are relatively
common in these areas (Maher, 1996).
Grey sandy soils (Entisols) are most extensive and account for 60% of the total area
under sugarcane. The red soils (Oxisols) comprise the second largest group (19%), followed
by the black Vertisols (13%) and brown Ultisol humic soils (8%). Many soils in the sugar
industry are subject to various degrees of crusting, under both rainfed and irrigated conditions
before crop canopy. Soil crusting is a precursor to soil loss through erosion because it limits
water peaetration into the soil (Meyer et al, 1996). Soils in sugarcane growing areas often
have high rates of erosion once the natural vegetation is removed (Platford, 1987).
Production of sugarcane in South Africa is a monoculture, with a mean of eight crops
before fields are re-established (van Antwerpen and Meyer, 1996). Historically cane
production has involved intensive cultivation and with it potential degradation of the soil
(Meyer et al, 1996). Sugarcane is a perennial, deep rooted, stool forming grass. Despite the
fact that it is cultivated as a row crop, it has excellent soil and water conserving
characteristics once the canopy is formed (The Experiment Station of the South African Sugar
Association, 1974). It has been established that 85-90% of average annual soil loss occurs
during the period where replanting takes place (Platford, 1987).
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4.2 Soil Conservation Practices Applicable to Sugarcane Farming
Soil conservation practices applicable to sugarcane farming are categorised as intra-
field soil conservation practices, which directly inhibit erosion from in-field areas, and soil
conservation practices that either safely transfer runoff into natural watercourses or stabilise
these watercourses.
4.2.1 Intra-field Soil Conservation Practices
The erosive power of water varies with the second power of its velocity and the
volume of particles that can be carried in suspension varies with the fifth power of the
velocity (The Experiment Station of the South African Sugar Association, 1974). Intra-panel
soil conservation practices are those that serve to reduce runoff and decrease its in-field
velocity, thus reducing soil erosion.
Conservation Terraces
Physical protection in the form of soil conservation structures has been the main way
of providing soil conservation for agricultural lands in South Africa. Water carrying terraces
are designed to intercept run-off water from the area immediately above and to convey it at an
acceptable velocity to suitable discharge points, usually waterways. The alternative to water
carrying terraces are spillover roads. Spillover roads do reduce in-field velocity of runoff,
however they do not remove water from the in-field area. Terrace banks can be stabilised by
cane, various grasses or, as in the case of broad base terraces, used as roads.
Spacing between conservation terraces (either water-carrying terraces or spillover
roads), measured as the panel width or vertical interval (VI), is important to ensure that runoff
does not exceed "safe" velocity. Optimum spacing of the banks depends on the ground slope,
soil type and farm management practices. All slopes on which sugarcane is grown
necessarily have soil conservation structures. Management decisions are the discrete choice
between water carrying terraces or spillover roads and the panel vertical interval.
Construction of soil conservation structures require substantial capital investment, as
do other conservation works. Subsequently, maintenance is required to keep them free of silt
and debris (The Experiment Station of the South African Sugar Association, 1974; McFarlane
and Maher, 1993, Platford, 1987). Plans to restructure soil conservation terraces on a
sugarcane field are likely to be implemented when that panel is replanted. This is only
necessary every 10 to 12 years because sugarcane can ratoon (Platford, 1987).
Trash Mulching
Mulches, such as trash, prevent surface crust formation under rainfall impact, thus
enhancing water infiltration rates and reducing soil erosion. Laboratory and field experiments
reported by Platford (1982) as cited by Meyer et al (1996), showed that strong crusts do not
form under a mulch (eg. trash), and that trash retained 89% more soil and 58% more water
than bare plots. Other advantages of trash mulching include the suppression of weeds,
decreased wind erosion, improved soil fertility and reduced ratoon decline.
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Trash mulching does, however, lower soil temperature which reduces ratoon vigour
and stalk population. This limits use of trashing on the South Coast and high altitude areas of
KwaZulu-Natal. Further, there is a clear trend in the industry towards burning at harvest
compared to trash mulching, primarily because burning decreases extraneous matter at the
mill, thus increasing cane quality; and because severely stressed cane infested with the stalk
borer eldana may not ratoon through a trash blanket (Meyer et al, 1996; McFarlane and
Maher, 1993).
Strip Cropping
Strip cropping (or strip replanting) means developing fields so that strips of cut or
ploughed out cane alternate with standing cane. There should be an age or stage in growth
difference of at least three months between adjacent strips. Soil loss is reduced through not
exposing whole hillsides at replant or harvest, the stage where most erosion occurs. Strip
cropping is a long term soil conservation measure. The strips are normal to the contour, and
strip widths should not exceed the limits for acceptable soil protection. Other advantages of
strip cropping include that it facilitates cutting cane at different stages on hillsides and the
management of different cane varieties, which may have different optimum ages for harvest,
bred for valley bottom and hilltop conditions. The fields also create fire breaks (Anonymous,
1996; McFarlane and Maher, 1993).
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Minimum Tillage
Conventional tillage produces a large number of failure plains, pulverises soils and
breaks down soil structure near the surface and creates a compaction layer at plough depth
which reduces infiltration, leading to increased runoff. Soils are consequently more prone to
wind and water erosion (Meyer et al, 1996). It has been shown that deep tillage of the soil
before replanting is unnecessary in most soils of the South African Sugar industry (Moberly,
1972, cited by Meyer et al, 1996).
Chemical minimum tillage, in which glyphosphate (Roundup) is used to kill the old
crop, reduces soil loss and increases yield relative to conventional methods of land
preparation. Minimum tillage also increases soil organic matter content and reduce its bulk
density and eliminates volunteer plants. The benefits vary according to soil type. Use is
restricted in winter because the crop must have reached six leaf stage to be effective (Meyer
et al, 1996; McFarlane and Maher, 1993). Following the removal of the patent rights to
roundup in 1994, a range of similar products became available and resulted in a lower price
for the product, which has reduced the cost of chemical minimum tillage (McCulloch and
Stranack, 1995).
Platford's Nomograph
Figure 4.1 depicts a nomograph designed by Platford (1987) to compute widths of
(vertical intervals between) panels in sugarcane fields to meet in-field soil conservation
requirements defined in terms of the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act of 1983.
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The nomograph takes into account soil erodibility (slope gradient and soil structure) and
adoption of soil conservation practices within that field. Predictions of soil loss for all the
possible combinations of factors, using the Universal Soil Loss Equations, were used to
prepare the Nomograph. The 45 ° lines in each quadrant represent the original standard
recommendations, viz. conventional tillage, no strip replanting and terrace banks. The
alternative lines in each quadrant account for the maximum effect that the various crop
management factors can have. The slopes and positions of the lines are dependent on how
much they reduce soil losses compared with the original standard practices (Platford, 1987).
Cropping mix is not considered to affect soil conservation of sugarcane fields because
production of sugarcane in South Africa is a monoculture (van Antwerpen and Meyer, 1996).
For example, if a field has a slope of 20%, the soil is classified as erodible; minimum
tillage will be used, a strip planting programme will be carried out, and terrace banks will be
built and the cane will be cut green leaving a trash mulch, then the panel vertical interval
must be less than or equal to 13,5m, which corresponds to a panel width of 70m. However, If
strip replanting is not carried out and the crop is burnt at the time of harvest, then a 10m
vertical interval or a panel width of 52m would be required (Platford, 1987). The nomograph
can also be used to check the adequacy of existing panels and crop management systems.
Clearly, practices that conserve soil allow for larger panel widths (vertical intervals).
It is apparent from the nomograph that a slope on which many (few) technologies are adopted
may still be unsatisfactorily (adequately) conserved if vertical interval between terraces is
sufficiently large (small). This illustrates the conceptual difference between conservation
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Figure 4.1 Nomograph to compute widths of panels in sugarcane fields (Platford, 1987: 153)
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4.2.2 Other Soil Conservation Practices
Diversion terraces should be provided above all fields situated below such
unconserved land as open veld, bush, homestead areas or labour compounds. These
conservation works are usually bare or grassed canals which, like conservation terraces, have
the soil removed from the canals and placed on the downslope side to form a bank. They are
constructed along the-upslope edges of cultivated land to trap runoff. The water is conveyed
to waterways or natural water courses. Maintenance is required to keep them free of silt and
debris (The Experiment Station of the South African Sugar Association, 1974).
Waterways are hydraulically stable structures, protected either by vegetation or more
durable materials and designed to safely convey runoff from erosion vulnerable in-field areas
to natural water courses (McFarlane and Maher, 1993). The protection of stream banks is
essential if severe erosion is to be avoided during heavy rains. Water courses can be
stabilised by using indigenous grasses and trees (Tudor-Owen and Wyatt, 1991).
Good roads have hard wearing surfaces that are impervious to water. Consequently
considerable runoff collects on roads so good drainage is important, not only to maintain the
land around the road, but also to maintain the road itself. Roads (especially major roads)
should follow crest lines, contours or conservation terraces, but this is not always possible
and steep diagonal, boundary or slope-break roads may have to be constructed (The
Experiment Station of the South African Sugar Association, 1974).
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4.3 South African Soil Conservation Policy
The first comprehensive review of the soil erosion problem in South Africa was given
in the report of the Drought Investigation Commission, 1923. The commission recommended
State action in connection with soil erosion which would require farmer co-operation. The
next significant event was the holding of a representative Soil Erosion Conference at Pretoria
in 1929 which proposed establishment of a permanent Soil Erosion Advisory Council. This
was established the following year and represents the first official granting of assistance to
farmers for combatting soil erosion. The Council ceased to exist after 1933. However, in the
same year the government approved a number of Soil Erosion Schemes which provided for
subsidisation of erosion works.
These pioneer schemes were abandoned fifteen years later in favour of more
comprehensive schemes in terms of the Soil Conservation Act, No. 45 of 1946.
Concurrently, the Division of Soil Conservation and Extension was created to implement the
provisions of the new Act. This Act conferred powers on the State to enforce conservation
through use of penalties of fines or imprisonment or both, but the spirit of the Act was to
encourage voluntary compliance with conservation requirements. The Act applied to all land,
but in practice excluded areas reserved by the State for Bantu occupation from its provisions.
The Act provided for the establishment of a national Soil Conservation Board,
primarily responsible for monitoring soil erosion and soil conservation throughout the
country. Section 9 of the Act allows any defined area of land to be proclaimed a soil
conservation district at the request of the landowners concerned. Section 26 of the Act
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provides that the State may of its own initiative proclaim any defined area of land as a soil
conservation area. Such a proclamation obliges all landowners in the district to conserve,
reclaim or improve his land, as may be necessary, overseen by a soil conservation committee.
Soil conservation committees are predominantly constituted by local farmers, but the Minister
may appoint up to one-third of the members at his discretion. Financial assistance granted for
soil conservation schemes in terms of the Soil Conservation Act were primarily based on the
cost of conservation works constructed, not conservation measures applied because soil
conservation measures usually do not require significant capital investment. Financial
assistance may take the form of loans, cash subsidies or special grants (Ross, 1963: 15-29;
Adler, 1985).
The Act showed considerable initial success, however, by 1969 "progress had been far
too slow" (Adler, 1985:34). The Soil Conservation Act was revised (Act No. 76 of 1969). In
terms of this Act each owner or occupier of land is responsible for observing the general
provisions of the Act. Subsequent prosecution of a number of malpracticers prompted many
more farmers to seek advice in implementing conservation farm plans. By 1980 73% of
agricultural land in South Africa had been planned in terms of the Soil Conservation Act,
1969 (Adler, 1985; The Experiment Station of the South African Sugar Association, 1974).
In 1983 legislation on control of soil erosion, noxious weeds and undesirable invader
plants was combined in one Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act, No. 43 of 1983.
The Act provided a necessary shift in the focus of soil conservation requirements from ex post
penalties to ex ante prevention and imposed ex ante regulation enforced by ex ante penalties
(McFarlane and Maher, 1993). In terms of the Soil Conservation Act of 1969 contraventions
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were treated leniently and only 36 prosecutions had been instituted in the period 1969 to
1983. It was also perceived that the previous maximum penalties did not serve as sufficient
deterrents; consequently penalties under the 1983 Act were made considerably more severe
(Adler, 1985). Further, for the first time, land users can be prosecuted for carrying out
farming practices which could lead to soil erosion, although no signs of erosion might be
visible (McFarlane and Maher, 1983).
Prior to the 1983 Act, soil conservation practices on sugarcane farms consisted
predominantly of conservation terraces and grassed waterways. The spacing of these banks
was based on a formula used in annually cropped areas and modified for the perennial crop of
sugarcane. The requirements of the Act were not met on slopes over 12% for erodible soils,
and over 22% for strongly structured soils when cultivated by normal ploughing.
Consequently, minimum tillage, strip planting, trash mulching and terrace banks were used to
control runoff from steep land (McFarlane and Maher, 1993).
4.4 Institutions Promoting Soil Conservation on Sugarcane Farms
In the coastal areas where predominantly sugarcane is grown, responsibility for
technical planning, and the provision of plans and specifications, has been vested in the
Experiment Station of the South African Sugar Association (SASEX). In areas where
sugarcane forms only part of a mixed farming enterprise, as in the case in the Natal Midlands,
the Department of Agricultural Technical Services and SASEX will be jointly responsible for
providing these services. The individual cane grower may choose which organisation he
approaches. The Department of Agricultural Technical Services is the sole authority on
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subsidies for soil conservation works (The Experiment Station of the South African Sugar
Association, 1974).
Land use plans (LUP's) are designed to hold soil loss to acceptable levels while
improving economies of the farm. The LUP combines factors such as agronomic practices,
mechanisation, climate, soils, water and topography to obtain the best possible economic
yield. Soil conservation provides the basis of all LUP's. LUP's have been found to increase
yields, although this may not be attributable to the soil conservation. Savings are also made
on infield haulage costs and fertiliser, through better siting of loading zones and roads. To
produce a LUP costs about R3135 for a lOOha farm (less than 0.5% of average annual total
revenue), while they have the potential to increase yield about 5% (Maher, 1996).
The South African Sugar Association has recognised that sugar growers need be made
aware of the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act of 1983, and consequently
implemented programs advocating soil conservation in 1986 (McFarlane and Maher, 1993).
The Lower Tugela Conservation Committee was the first to promote improved conservation
of farmland through better farming practices. This was undertaken partially through a mass
media approach incorporating dramatic illustrations of erosion (Hulbert, 1990).
Soil conservation committees are available to assess farms and make
recommendations towards compliance with the 1983 Act. Recommendations on adoption of
soil conservation practices by soil conservation committees and SASEX to South African
sugarcane growers are based on Platford's nomograph (McFarlane and Maher, 1993) and
allow for maximum possible autonomy in farmer choice of practices but ensure that
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requirements of the Act are met. Prior to 1989, Soil conservation committees were
responsible for large regions, often covering three of four mill group areas. In 1989 South
African Sugar Association initiated a move which gave grower groups the option of forming
their own local environmental committees or continuing as conservation committees. The
new structure gave growers closer contact with environmental control (McFarlane and Maher,
1993).
4.5 Discussion
Whole farm soil conservation efficiency is achieved on sugarcane land by adoption of intra-
panel soil conservation practices that inhibit in-field erosion, augmented by other soil
conservation practices that safely transfer runoff into natural watercourses and stabilise these
watercourses. It is apparent that some intra-panel soil conservation practices involve annual
decisions (and low capital investment) whereas others involve decisions taken every 10-12
years (with large capital outlays). Because panels are homogenous in management practices
applied, the decision to adopt a soil conservation practices on a panel is a discrete choice and
extensiveness of adoption within a panel is not an issue. Following Platford (1987), it
appears reasonable to assume that panels are homogenous in soil conservation efficiency and
soil conservation efficiency of individual panels can be assessed relative to the requirements
of the 1983 Act using Platford's (1987) nomograph. It may be argued that the requirements
defined by this technological information are not necessarily optimum for all situations.
However, because recommendations on adoption of soil conservation practices by SASEX to
South African sugarcane growers are based on this nomograph (McFarlane and Maher, 1993),
assessment of soil conservation efficiency using this nomograph will provide measurement
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that is both objective and which has familiar interpretation for policy makers and members of
the South African sugar industry. Consequently, farmers' soil conservation decisions on their
sugarcane land are easily applied to the models conceptualised in chapter 2. It is expected
that intra-field soil conservation efficiency will closely approximate whole farm soil
conservation efficiency.
The introductory chapter has previously motivated that soil conservation on South
African sugarcane farms is an important policy issue. However, relating soil conservation
decisions to farmer characteristics, and in particular farmers' risk preferences, requires that
farmers are responsible for their own soil conservation decisions. This chapter has indicated
that small and developing sugarcane farmers have not necessarily been responsible for their
own conservation practices, whereas commercial farmers have been provided autonomy in
deciding which soil conservation measures they use. Consequently, this research investigates
commercial fanners' soil conservation decisions.
Many of the behavioural economic studies of farmers' soil conservation decisions
reviewed in the previous chapter found that considerable variation in farmers' decisions is
accounted for by differences in land use or region. Clearly land use influences rates of
erosion: rates of erosion are considerably higher on cultivated land as opposed to veld; and
some soil conservation practices are not appropriate for some cropping systems or are not
applicable in certain climatic regions. Analysis of a population with homogenous land use
type and climate will abstract as far as possible from variation attributable to physical
constraints and focus on variables subject to policy influence. It is previously noted that farm
enterprise mix does not affect infield soil conservation efficiency of sugarcane land, thus
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restricting the analysis to sugarcane land is useful. Climate, however, does affect soil
conservation decisions because use of certain practices is restricted where irrigation is used,
and because trash mulching is less feasible at altitude and on the south coast of KwaZulu-
Natal. Consequently, the study population was restricted to rainfed sugarcane land. The
Eston, Sezela, and Mzimkulu sugar mill areas were selected to encompass the survey
population due to their close proximity to each other and because sugarcane production in
these areas is predominantly rainfed.
Analysis of choice requires heterogeneity in decisions. This chapter has indicated that
sugarcane growing areas are prone to soil erosion. Despite government legislated soil
conservation requirements there exists considerable scope for variation between farmers' use
of soil conservation measures in their crop management systems. Government has also
afforded commercial farmers considerable institutional and financial assistance to expedite
soil conservation. The South African sugar industry further promotes soil conservation on
sugarcane farms and provides further institutional support to sugarcane farmers.
Consequently, it is a priori expected that heterogeneity does exist in both sugarcane farmers'
use of soil conservation measures and achieved soil conservation efficiency.
This chapter has indicated that analysis of sugarcane farmers' intra-panel soil
conservation decisions is feasible using the model conceptualised in chapter 2. Further, it is
shown that the population of commercial sugarcane farmers with rainfed cane from the Eston,
Sezela and Mzimkulu sugar mill areas of KwaZulu-Natal provide a suitable study population
for this research. The analysis proceeds in the next chapter to specify the research
methodology.
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5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION
The objectives of the models specified are to determine the sets of factors which
respectively influence farmers' risk preferences and their soil conservation decisions; and
thereby determine the link, if any, between the two. The methodology employed is designed
around the conceptual models developed in Chapter 2 with due consideration of issues raised
in the literature review and knowledge of the chosen study population.
This chapter describes the methodology used to elicit fanners' risk preferences and
specifies econometric models for the analysis of factors affecting elicited risk preferences in
sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 respectively. Section 5.2. describes model specification of models
used for analysing farmers' soil conservation decisions, including assessment of soil
conservation effectiveness. A brief discussion on comparing the relative importance of
covariates in regression models follows. A survey questionnaire was designed to collect the
necessary data. Section 5.4 and 5.5 describe the data collection procedure and provides
descriptive statistics of the survey sample respectively.
5,1 Methodology for Eliciting and Analysing Risk Preferences
5.1.1 Eliciting Risk Preferences
The literature review identified three general approaches to eliciting risk preferences,
all of which may be adjusted appropriately to account for the sensitivity of AP's to the range
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and scale of the data. Despite criticisms that the entire residual is assigned to risk
preferences, econometric estimation approaches have shown considerable advance in recent
years and a trend of increasing popularity is evident. However, risk preferences are costly to
elicit under the econometric approach (both in terms of data requirements and estimation
procedure) relative to direct elicitation procedures.
The direct elicitation of utility (DEU) approach has been criticised on grounds of
subjectivity involved in the identification of the utility function's functional form, individuals
biases towards probabilities, preference for specific probabilities (for example, a 50:50 bet),
and negative preferences towards gambling. Although the preceding remarks indicate a
priori concern, Young (1979) stresses that the DEU approach must be judged according to its
ability to produce results in accordance with actual economic behaviour.
A long standing controversy in the elicitation of risk preferences is whether actual
monetary incentives are necessary to induce truthful preference revelations. Although
evidence from the literature as reviewed by Gunjal and Legault (1995) suggests that monetary
incentives fail to change respondents behaviour, their results were inconclusive in this regard.
Possible reasons include that individuals may respond to hypothetical situations in such a way
that minimise his cost of participating, including cost of his time, rather than reflecting his
true preferences (Robison, 1982). Whilst preferences elicited using actual monetary
payments may be more reliable, typical budgetary restraints may preclude the researcher from
asking meaningful questions eg. low value can be attached to inferences made from risk
preferences elicited from gambles of small monetary incentives (Kachelmeier and Shehata,
1992).
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Tversky et al (1990) as cited by Kachelmier and Shehata (1992) provide evidence
from a large number of preference reversal studies that lottery choices do not necessarily
correspond to preferences inferred from a lottery pricing task. Further, the literature reviewed
suggests that respondents may face difficulties in differentiating the level of risk implied by
each pair of distributions. It is reiterated that Binswanger (1980) favoured a lottery choice
task due to concern over low respondent literacy impeding a certainty equivalent approach.
In light of the above arguments, a direct elicitation of utility through preset choices
approach was employed to elicit farmers' risk preferences. Budgetary constraints precluded
use of actual monetary incentives. The survey population is characterised by high literacy and
education, consequently respondents were expected to understand the elicitation of certainty
equivalent procedure. Elicitation through preset choices was favoured over the Delphi
process (see Gunjal and Legault, 1995) as only one round of questioning was feasible and
lotteries were to be kept consistent across all participants to aid comparison of risk
preferences.
Certainty equivalents were elicited for hypothetical lotteries considered separately.
Survey respondents were presented with five hypothetical but realistic lotteries of the form
(xmax,xmin,p), promising a monetary prize of xmax with probability p or xmin with probability 1 -
p. Lottery characteristics were varied to capture how changes to the risk situation affect
revealed risk behaviour. Consequently, none of the information collected should be
redundant. Table 5.1 summarises these lotteries. Lottery ranges varied from R20000 to
Rl 00000 and were chosen to represent significantly large income and wealth risks for the
farmers to ensure meaningful response. Probability of a win (loss) was described as the flip
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of a coin to overcome probability preference, and all lotteries had positive expected values to
encourage participation, despite the chance of a hypothetical loss in wealth in lotteries 2, 4
and 5. The games were always played in numerical order to ensure that successive games
increased in risk faced (either gamble range increased or had negative "loss" values) to hold
the respondents attention. Only five lotteries (g = 1,..., 5) were used due to concern that
respondents may quickly become bored with prolonged playing of these hypothetical games
and because only one round of questioning was considered feasible.

































To begin a trial respondents were required to choose between the hypothetical options
of a specified lottery and a certain monetary amount, initially its expected value. Deductions
(increments) from (to) the certain monetary alternative were made as appropriate and the
question reasked. This was repeated until a point of indifference was reached, determining
each subject's certainty equivalent for that gamble. Utility functions of the forms
Ug(x) = -e'
XgXandUg(x) = -e~
gX were assumed, where x* = (x - xmin)/(xmax - xmjn),
normalising the x* range from 0 to 1. Values of the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion (Ag)
and adjusted Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion (A*g) coefficients were calculated from the
elicited certainty equivalents for all participants and for all lotteries by fitting the respective
functions/= 0.5+0.5e ~X(x™~x™) -e~
A(JC~*mJ and / = 0.5+0.5<rr -e~Vx\
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5.1.2 Analysing Risk Preferences
Because risk preferences are elicited for hypothetical lotteries, it is necessary that the
elicited risk preferences be subjected to tests before they are accepted and related to
respondents' soil conservation decisions. Following Dillon and Scandizzo (1978) the elicited
risk preference of the zth respondent is hypothesised to be a function of a) the risk of the
prospect presented to him in the experiment and b) a socioeconomic component. The risk of
the prospect may be defined by the moments of the probability distribution of the uncertain
prospect (eg. Dillon and Scandizzo, 1978 and Grisley and Kellog, 1987) or some alternative
measure, eg. Katchelmeir and Sehata (1992) used the prize level and the probability of a win.
It is hypothesised that risk aversion is positively related to risk.
Literature reviewed indicates that there exists a large gap in knowledge and
understanding regarding the socioeconomic component. The problem stems from the way in
which risk attitudes are intimately associated with complex behavioural characteristics of the
individual farmer and the difficulties in separating risk related responses from other forms of
behaviour (Bond and Wonder, 1980) and because many socioeconomic variables are
determined jointly with risk aversion (Binswanger, 1980). Even independent sources of risk
are substitutes which gives rise to risk trading (Gabrial and Baker, 1980). Consequently, a
priori expectations regarding sings of coefficients on the essentially endogenous covariates
cannot be determined theoretically (Grisley and Kellog, 1987). Causality between risk
preferences and independently determined socioeconomic factors is theoretically more sound,
eg. Arrow's hypothesis that risk aversion decreases with wealth because wealth increases
capacity to bear risk.
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Previous research efforts to relate socioeconomic factors to risk preferences have
tended to consider factors that are determined jointly with risk aversion eg. land rented by
Binswanger (1980); income by Binswanger (1980) and Dillon and Scandizzo (1978); off-
farm income by Bond and Wonder (1980) and Moscardi and de Janvry (1977); enterprise
diversification by Grisley and Kellog (1987) and Wilson and Eidman (1983); solvency by
Wilson and Eidman (1983); enterprise or farm size by Moscardi and de Janvry (1977),
Grisley and Kellog (1987) and Belaid and Miller (1987); and membership of credit solidarity
groups by Moscardi and de Janvry (1977); amongst other variables. Binswanger (1980) also
included a "psychological" variable, LUCK, to capture how past experience impacts on a
respondent's choice; Dillon and Scandizzo considered respondents ethical attitudes towards
gambling; whereas Grisley and Kellog (1987) elicited measures of respondents abstract and
mathematical abilities. Common covariates that are determined independently of risk
aversion include wealth, age and education. Although the hypothesised relationship between
wealth and risk aversion is clear, hypotheses linking age to risk aversion usually follow the
argument that a relationship exists between age and wealth. Further, links between education
and risk aversion are generally not rationalised in these studies.
Most researchers are cognisant of problems associated with uncertain causality
between these variables and risk aversion, and hence refer to the estimated regressions or
discriminant functions as correlation analyses. Nonetheless, the merit of conducting these
analyses is questionable. They are usually rationalised as having predictive merit, however
poor statistical fit of the estimated equations lends little support for this. Binswanger (1980)
considered his own analysis to have merit because of its exploratory nature. Bond and
Wonder (1980), however, explain that hypotheses cannot be tested for variables where
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causality is uncertain, whilst Wilson and Eidman (1983: 181) commented of their own
results that "All we can say about these results is that some associations between risk
attitudes and socio-economic variables were obtained".
It is clear from this discussion that the objective of ratifying the elicited risk aversion
coefficients is best achieved by relating them to risk characteristics of the lotteries for which
they are elicited rather than socioeconomic characteristics of respondents. An appropriate
model is specified in this section. Because previous studies have emphasised the merits of
relating socioeconomic factors to risk preferences for exploratory and predictive purposes, a
similar analysis is conducted in this study. However, because it is external to the focus of this
thesis this correlation analysis is presented in appendix B.
The econometric model specified examines the impact of gamble range and risk of a
loss in wealth on revealed risk preference. Panel data sets usually consist of observations
over a number of individuals, say I = 1, 2,..., I, over several time periods, say t = 1, 2,..., T.
Following Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) repeated measures from the same individual, in
this case the X*ig's, g= 1,2,..., G, are used in place of time periods. Clearly, systematic
differences between individual subject's risk preferences would induce correlated errors in
ordinary linear regression testing gamble characteristic effects in panel data. Consequently,
individual subject effects are included in the model as dummy variables, such that the (i,g)th
observation on the general dummy variable model can be written as:
£ • " * . ...(5.1)
